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The colonization of the world by European nations has been of
no small significance in creating the current global economic
landscape of consumerism, industrialization, and development-
based growth.  By opening vast territories to settlement and nat-
ural-resource extraction, providing a steady influx of capital, and
creating new markets, colonialism was instrumental in fueling the
industrial revolution and launching the modern global economy.1
Indigenous peoples2 and their territories have been, and continue
to be, casualties of this mad dash to appropriate the world’s lands
and resources.3  Despite recent international and domestic ef-
1 See J.M. BLAUT, THE COLONIZER’S MODEL OF THE WORLD: GEOGRAPHICAL
DIFFUSIONISM AND EUROCENTRIC HISTORY 17-30, 26, 179-206 (1993); see also
JAMES W. LOEWEN, LIES MY TEACHER TOLD ME: EVERYTHING YOUR AMERICAN
HISTORY TEXTBOOK GOT WRONG 69 (First Touchstone ed. 1996) (emphasizing the
role of wealth taken from the Americas in shaping the modern market economy).
2 The United Nations has defined “indigenous peoples” as:
those which, having a historical continuity with pre-invasion and pre-colo-
nial societies that developed on their territories, consider themselves dis-
tinct from other sectors of societies now prevailing in those territories, or
parts of them.  They form at present non-dominant sectors of society and
are determined to preserve, develop, and transmit to future generations
their ancestral territories, and their ethnic identity, as the basis of their
continued existence as peoples, in accordance with their own cultural pat-
terns, social institutions and legal systems.
UN Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities,
Study of the Problem of Discrimination Against Indigenous Populations , vol. V.,
para. 379, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1986/Add.4 (1986) (submitted by  Jose Martinez
Cobo, Special Rapporteur).  Indigenous peoples are remarkably diverse and make
up a sizeable portion of the world’s population. See, e.g. , The Univ. of Minn.
Human Rights Res. Ctr., The Rights of Indigenous Peoples, http://www.hrusa.org/
indig/introduction.pdf (last visited Oct. 2, 2006) (“Indigenous Peoples worldwide
number between 300-500 million, embody and nurture 80% of the world’s cultural
and biological diversity, and occupy 20% of the world’s land surface.”).
3 See, e.g. , Richard L. Herz, Litigating Environmental Abuses Under the Alien Tort
Claims Act: A Practical Assessment , 40 VA. J. INT’L L. 545, 547-49 (2000) (detailing
the environmental abuses visited upon populations in Ecuador and Indonesia by
transnational corporations engaged in resource extraction); Gail Osherenko, Indige-
nous Rights in Russia: Is Title to Land Essential for Cultural Survival? , 13 GEO.
INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 695, 695-96 (2001) (noting threats from mineral, oil, and gas
development; timber cutting; commercial fishing; and tourism faced by indigenous
peoples in northern Russia); Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report on the Situation of Human
Rights in Brazil , ch. VI, paras. 22, 33, 63, 65, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.97, doc. 29 rev. 1
(Sept. 29, 1997), available at  http://www.cidh.org/ countryrep/brazil-eng/
chaper%206%20.htm#HUMAN%20RIGHTS%20OF (describing a multitude of
encroachments on the territories of the indigenous peoples of Brazil) [hereinafter
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forts to recognize and protect indigenous rights,4 colonialist ide-
als remain deeply ingrained in many of the world’s political,
economic, and legal power structures.5  Although the era of overt
empire building has passed, the mission once executed by the
sword and the gun is now accomplished by the boardroom direc-
tives of transnational corporations and the legislative acts of po-
litical majorities6—the subjugation of indigenous peoples and
their homelands to the economic “needs” of the so-called devel-
oped world.7
Brazil Report]; see also Mary Christina Wood, Indian Land and the Promise of Na-
tive Sovereignty: The Trust Doctrine Revisited , 1994 UTAH L. REV. 1471, 1483-89
(1994) (describing modern pressures to exploit indigenous lands and resources in the
United States).
4 See, e.g. , Inter-Am. C.H.R., Annual Report 1996, Proposed American Declara-
tion on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples  ch. IV., OEA/Ser.L/V/II.95, doc 6 (1996)
(approved Feb. 26, 1997) available at http://www.cidh.org/annualrep/96eng/
chap.4.htm [hereinafter Proposed Declaration].
5 See BLAUT, supra note 1, at 1-2, 26-30.  Blaut describes the continuing influence
of the myth of “European diffusionism,” the colonialist notion that European na-
tions historically have been more advanced than the nations they colonized, and that
Europe formed a kind of reservoir of ability, power, and intellect—an “inside”
which dictated the course of world events to the “outside.” Id.  at 1.  Thus, the very
process of European ascendancy was proof to Europeans of the superiority of Euro-
pean culture—the ascendancy, it was believed, was triggered by internal forces pro-
jected outward, rather than external forces projected inward. Id.
6 See, e.g. , Herz, supra note 3, at 547-49; see also Wood, supra note 3, at 1471, R
1483-89 (describing the intense outside pressure to exploit, develop, and industrial-
ize the remaining indigenous lands within the United States); id. at 1489-95 (describ-
ing how government action geared toward majoritarian interests threatens
indigenous lands within the United States).
7 I use the term “developed world” reluctantly because the inference often will be
that nations or peoples not included within the sweep of that term are somehow
inferior, as in culturally  undeveloped or underdeveloped.  I use the word “devel-
oped,” not in this sense, nor to refer to industrialization per se.  Rather, by “devel-
oped world,” I refer to a particular kind  of socioeconomic development flowing
from the political, economic, and cultural legacy of European colonization. See
BLAUT, supra note 1, at 28 (Blaut refers to this process as the diffusion of “moderni- R
zation.”).  That there is a “developing world” at all then refers, not to a process of
“catching up” (although that probably is how the term generally is understood), but
to a particular neocolonial process. See id. at 28-29 (describing the modern global
influence of the colonizer’s worldview).  Likewise, when this Comment uses the
term “development” in the general sense, it refers to the same neocolonial “modern-
ization” model of economic development. See id. at 27-28.  However, it is important
to recognize that “development” need not occur along these lines. Cf. Proposed
Declaration , supra note 4, at pmbl., para. 2 (emphasizing the right of indigenous R
peoples to pursue development “in accordance with their own traditions, needs and
interests .”) (emphasis added); id.  at art. XXI, para. 1 (“The states recognize the right
of indigenous peoples to decide democratically what values, objectives, priorities
and strategies will govern and steer their development course, even where they are
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Although, from a geopolitical perspective, colonialism may
have triumphed over indigeneity, it is now clear that the eco-
nomic model born of colonialism—that of consumerism, re-
source-intensive development, and industrialization—is no
panacea for human kind.  The benefits to the world’s “haves” are
undeniable and include wealth, technology, education, improved
health care, and increased life expectancies.8  However, the ne-
ocolonial development model has spawned environmental
problems that threaten to offset any of its gains.  From climate
change and resource depletion to pollution and the loss of bi-
odiversity, the benefits of development have come at a heavy
price,9 a price too often imposed on the world’s “have-nots” (in-
cluding indigenous peoples),10 with the balance due charged off
to future generations.11
different from those adopted by the national government or by other segments of soci-
ety .”) (emphasis added).
Perhaps because the English language is the language of colonizers, it is difficult
to choose a term that operates as a convenient shorthand for the distinction between
“developed” and “developing” without implying any sort of cultural bias.  I chose
the “developed/developing” distinction because it is not so patently Eurocentric as
distinctions between “First World” and “Third World” nations, or “civilized” and
“primitive” societies.  I avoid also geographical generalizations such as “North/
South” because the distinction I make is not entirely geographical—it exists within
nations as well as between regions. But cf. DAVID HUNTER ET AL., INTERNATIONAL
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY 166-67 (Robert C. Clark et al. eds., 2d ed. 2002)
(making more broadly based distinctions using the same terminology).
8 In a process that is both profitable to developed nations and serves to justify
neocolonialism, the developed world promises to extend these benefits to the rest of
the world through exportation of its own particular neocolonial development para-
digm. See BLAUT, supra note 1, at 29. R
9 See Lester R. Brown et al., Foreword to STATE OF THE WORLD 2000 at xvii, xvii-
xviii (Linda Starke ed., 2000) (discussing various issues affecting the world popula-
tion, including aquifer depletion and global warming) [hereinafter Brown I]; Lester
R. Brown, Challenges of the New Century, in STATE OF THE WORLD 2000, supra , at
3, 4-5 (discussing positive and negative effects of the “longest peacetime economic
expansion in history”) [hereinafter Brown II]; HUNTER ET AL., supra note 7, at 1-8 R
(presenting an overview of current environmental issues).
10 See, e.g. , Herz, supra note 3 at 547-49 (providing specific examples of destruc- R
tive environmental impacts of resource extraction on indigenous populations); see
also HUNTER ET AL., supra note 7, at 54-55 (describing the income and consumption R
gaps between wealthy and poor nations).  Conventional wisdom in the developed
world holds that these inequities can be resolved by exporting to developing coun-
tries a particular paradigm of economic development. See, e.g. , id. at 179-80.  How-
ever, Blaut suggests that this philosophy is more grounded in ideology than fact. See
BLAUT, supra note 1, at 26-29. R
11 See Brown II, supra note 9, at 9 (noting that negative environmental trends R
jeopardize future progress).
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To its credit, the developed world has not ignored completely
the harms and injustices of the modern global economy.  Rather,
the global community has employed both domestic and interna-
tional law to address the environmental fallout of development,
occasionally with great success.12  The notion of “sustainable de-
velopment” has become one of the central organizing principles
of these efforts, especially on the international stage.13  Although
it can be difficult to identify precisely what policymakers mean
by “sustainable development”—in part because the terminology
marries principles that are difficult to harmonize14—it at least
embodies the realization that the earth’s ecosystems and re-
source pools cannot indefinitely support unmanaged and unre-
strained development.15  Accordingly, development must be
tempered so that future generations can continue to reap its ben-
efits without suffering undue environmental harms.16
Unfortunately, if one views sustainable development as seek-
ing a balance between long-term management and preservation
of lands and resources (sustainability) and tapping them for pre-
sent consumption (development), the principle finds little ulti-
mate validation in the realities of the modern global economy.
Whatever weights have been applied to the sustainability side of
the scale (e.g., in the form of stricter laws and more efficient
technologies), they have been more than offset by new develop-
ment, which continues apace as the global population swells, the
12 See, e.g. , HUNTER ET AL., supra note 7, at 5 (discussing the success of interna- R
tional agreements aimed at halting and reversing depletion of the ozone layer).
13 See id. at 179-80.
14 See id. at 180 (noting the “brilliant ambiguity” of the term); see also Ved P.
Nanda, Sustainable Development, International Trade and the DOHA Agenda for
Development , 8 CHAP. L. REV. 53, 54 (2005) (noting that sustainable development is
a paradigm for “reconciling and integrating the goals of economic development, so-
cial development, and environmental protection, goals that can often be at odds with
one another”).
15 See WORLD COMM’N ON ENV’T AND DEV., OUR COMMON FUTURE 45 (1987)
(“Growth has set no limits in terms of population or resource use beyond which lies
ecological disaster. . . . But ultimate limits there are.”).
16 See, e.g. , United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UN-
CED), Rio Declaration on Environment and Development , princ. 3, U.N. Doc. A/
CONF.151/26/Rev.1, (June 14, 1992), reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 874 (1992) [hereinafter
Rio Declaration] (“The right to development must be fulfilled so as to equitably
meet developmental and environmental needs of present and future generations.”).
\\server05\productn\O\OEL\21-1\OEL105.txt unknown Seq: 6 10-JAN-07 12:00
162 J. ENVTL. LAW AND LITIGATION [Vol. 21, 157
developing world industrializes, and consumerism spreads
around the globe.17
Accordingly, the global community must do some line-drawing
if it wishes to pay more than lip service to the principle of sus-
tainability in international environmental law.  While this can
and should be done by instituting “hard law” treaty regimes
aimed at specific environmental problems (such as climate
change or pollution), a crucial step lies in rejecting the colonialist
norms regarding the treatment of indigenous peoples that precip-
itated many of the problems in the first place.  Specifically, the
developed world must depart from its historical mistreatment of
indigenous peoples, lands, and resources by recognizing and en-
forcing indigenous rights and, in particular, indigenous property
rights.18
Recognizing and enforcing indigenous property rights pro-
motes environmental sustainability in two specific ways: one fo-
cused on restricting external appropriators and the other on
empowering indigenous occupants.  First, strong indigenous
property rights effectively shield vast territories and resource
pools from outright appropriation by the world’s largest consum-
ers.19  Second, such rights promote a diversity of approaches to
human interaction with the environment, entrusting stewardship
of particular ecosystems to the finely tuned cultural expertise
that indigenous peoples have developed through millennial rela-
tionships with their ancestral lands.  Because maintaining an in-
digenous land base is critical to the continuing survival of
indigenous cultures,20 strong indigenous property rights are key
to this diversity effect.
17 See Brown I, supra note 9, at xvii-xviii; Brown II, supra note 9, at 4-8; HUNTER R
ET AL., supra note 7, at 44-45, 54-56; see also Nanda, supra  note 14, at 62 (noting the R
failure of sustainable development to prevent environmental deterioration).
18 See HUNTER ET AL., supra  note 7, at 1286 (explaining the importance of rights- R
based approaches to achieving sustainable development).
19 This effect has potential to be quite large, based on the geographical distribu-
tion of indigenous peoples throughout the world. See  Univ. of Minn. Human Rights
Res. Ctr., supra note 2.  It will be most dramatic, however, where so-called “uncon- R
tacted” tribes and their territories are shielded from outside contamination with un-
familiar technologies and customs, so as to preserve those tribes’ traditional balance
with their ecosystems. See Scott Wallace, Into the Amazon , NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC,
Aug. 2003, 6, 11 (noting the interplay between ecological preservation and the pro-
tection of uncontacted tribes).
20 See, e.g. , Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community v. Nicaragua, 2001 Inter-
Am. Ct. H.R., (ser. C) No. 79, para. 149 (Aug. 31, 2001), available at http://
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Strengthening the status of indigenous property rights in inter-
national law starts with liberally construing existing human rights
documents to adequately account for indigenous conceptions of
those rights.21  For instance, a generic “right to property” such as
that found in Article 21 of the American Convention on Human
Rights22 has little meaning as applied to indigenous peoples un-
less construed, as it has been, to embrace traditional modes of
indigenous ownership—particularly communal ownership organ-
ized around collective land tenure.23  Furthermore, although ex-
isting human-rights regimes provide a logical starting point, there
is a need for a network of binding international agreements di-
rectly addressing indigenous property rights; such a step would
confront both the historical appropriation of indigenous lands
and resources by colonialist conquerors as well as continuing
seizures by neocolonialist enterprises.
This Comment proceeds in four parts.  Part I traces the histori-
cal development of the colonialist conception of indigenous
property rights, and describes how that conception continues to
facilitate the developed world’s exploitation of indigenous peo-
ples, territories, and resources.  Part II discusses the failings of
the sustainable development model in international environmen-
tal law.  Part III proposes that using international law to
decolonize the developed world’s conception of indigenous prop-
erty rights can play a significant role in realizing the goal of envi-
ronmental sustainability.  Part IV examines the Inter-American
Human Rights System as a positive model for further advance-
ments in the field of indigenous property rights, both in terms of
www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/seriec_79_ing.pdf [hereinafter Awas Tingni
Case].
21 See, e.g. , id.  at para. 148; cf. BLAUT, supra note 1, at 25 (noting that European R
colonizers denied the existence of indigenous property rights based on the theory
that indigenous people did not recognize the concept of individual ownership).
22 Organization of American States, American Convention on Human Rights,
Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123 (entered into force July 18,
1978), reprinted in Basic Documents Pertaining to Human Rights in the Inter-
American System, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.82 doc. 6 rev. 1 at 25 (1992), available at http://
www1.umn.edu/humanrts/oasinstr/zoas3con.htm [hereinafter American Conven-
tion].
23 See, e.g. , Awas Tingni Case , 2001 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., (ser. C) No. 79 at para.
149; see also id.  at para. 148 (“[I]t is the opinion of this Court that article 21 of the
[American Convention] protects the right to property in a sense which includes,
among others, the rights of members of the indigenous communities within the
framework of communal property . . . .”).
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its expansive interpretations of existing human rights documents
and a draft proposal directly addressing indigenous rights.
I
FROM PAST TO PRESENT: COLONIALISM’S IMPACT ON
INDIGENOUS PEOPLES AND TERRITORIES
A. Colonialist Conceptions of Indigenous Ownership
European colonization drove a particular model of economic
development by supplying colonialist nations with capital, natu-
ral resources, cheap labor, new markets, and new lands for settle-
ment.24  However, in reaping the benefits of their colonies,
Europeans were confronted with a legal and ethical dilemma
posed by the millions of indigenous people already in possession
of the so-called New World, a dilemma that colonialist govern-
ments resolved, in part, simply by denying that indigenous peo-
ples possessed ownership rights sufficient to defeat colonists’
claims.25  To justify both their denial of indigenous property
rights and their (often brutal) exploitations of indigenous people,
European colonizers adopted a racially and culturally biased
worldview that elevated European qualities and values over
those of indigenous societies.26  James W. Loewen describes this
rationalization process in terms of “cognitive dissonance”:
It is always useful to think badly about people one has ex-
ploited or plans to exploit.  Modifying one’s opinions to bring
them into line with one’s actions is the most common outcome
of the process known as “cognitive dissonance”. . . . To treat
badly another person whom we consider a reasonable human
being creates a tension between act and attitude that demands
resolution.  We cannot erase what we have done, and to alter
our future behavior may not be in our interest.  To change our
attitude is easier.27
24 See BLAUT, supra note 1, at 17-30; see also LOEWEN, supra  note 1, at 69 (dis- R
cussing the importance of American bullion to the rise of capitalism, the industrial
revolution, and European dominance of the global economy).
25 See BLAUT, supra note 1, at 25; see, e.g. , Johnson v. McIntosh, 21 U.S. (8 R
Wheat.) 543, 584 (1823) (explaining the right of the European “discoverer” to “ap-
propriate the lands occupied by the Indians”).
26 See BLAUT, supra note 1, at 19-20; see also LOEWEN, supra note 1, at 60, 68; R
Robert A. Williams, Jr., Columbus’s Legacy: The Rehnquist Court’s Perpetuation of
European Cultural Racism Against American Indian Tribes , 39 FED. B. NEWS & J. 6,
358-69 (1992) [hereinafter Williams I].
27 LOEWEN, supra  note 1, at 68 (citing LEON FESTINGER, A THEORY OF COGNI- R
TIVE DISSONANCE (1957)).
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Describing a particularly disturbing example of this process,
Loewen recounts Christopher Columbus’ interactions with the
Arawaks.28  Loewen tells us that Columbus’ first impressions of
the Arawaks were favorable;29 however, those impressions
changed as his brutality toward them increased:
When Columbus was selling Queen Isabella on the wonders of
the Americas, the Indians were “well built” and “of quick in-
telligence.”  “They have very good customs,” he wrote, “and
the king maintains a very marvelous state, of a style so orderly
that it is a pleasure to see it, and they have good memories and
they wish to see everything and ask what it is and for what it is
used.”  Later when Columbus was justifying his wars and his
enslavement of the Indians, they became “cruel” and “stupid,”
“a people warlike and numerous, whose customs and religion
are very different from ours.”
. . . .
Columbus gives us the first recorded example of cognitive dis-
sonance in the Americas, for although the Indians may have
changed from hospitable to angry, they could hardly have
evolved from intelligent to stupid so quickly.  The change must
have been in Columbus.30
Having thus convinced themselves that the Arawaks were un-
deserving of basic human rights, Columbus and his men took
what they wanted by force.  The Spaniards hunted Arawaks for
sport and murdered them for dog food.31  They enslaved them—
cutting off the hands of those who failed to pay tribute in gold or
cotton32—and traded girls as young as nine or ten as sex slaves.33
Within the space of a few years, the Arawak culture was com-
pletely disrupted and the Arawak people, lands, and resources
were all under Spanish control.  Loewen, drawing in part on pri-
mary source material, describes the Spanish “reign of terror” that
ultimately resulted in the extermination of an entire people:
[T]he colonists made the Indians mine gold for them, raise
Spanish food, and even carry them everywhere they went. . . .
Pedro de Cordoba wrote in a letter to King Ferdinand in 1517,
“As a result of the sufferings and hard labor they have en-
dured, the Indians choose, and have chosen suicide.  Occasion-
ally a hundred have committed mass suicide.  The women,
28 The Arawaks were indigenous inhabitants of the Caribbean islands in 1492. Id.
at 60.
29 Id.
30 Id.  at 68.
31 Id. at 62.
32 Id.
33 Id. at 65.
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exhausted by labor, have shunned conception and childbirth
. . . Many, when pregnant, have taken something to abort and
have aborted.  Others after delivery have killed their children
with their own hands, so as not to leave them in such oppres-
sive slavery.”
Beyond acts of individual cruelty, the Spanish disrupted the
Indian ecosystem and culture.  Forcing Indians to work in
mines rather than in their gardens led to widespread malnutri-
tion.  The intrusion of rabbits and livestock caused further
ecological disaster.  Diseases new to the Indians played a role,
although smallpox, usually the big killer, did not appear on the
island until after 1516. . . .  Estimates of Haiti’s pre-Columbian
population range as high as 8,000,000 people. . . .  “By 1516,”
according to [historian and author] Benjamin Keen, “thanks to
the sinister Indian slave trade and labor policies initiated by
Columbus, only some 12,000 remained.”  [Historian] Las Cass
tells us that fewer than 200 Indians were alive in 1542.  By
1555, they were all gone.34
Haiti under Spanish rule is one of the “primary instances of
genocide in all of human history.”35  However, compared with
later European colonizers, there was nothing particularly unusual
in the Spaniards’ treatment of the Arawaks.  Loewen notes that
Columbus “introduced two phenomena that revolutionized race
relations and transformed the modern world: the taking of land,
wealth, and labor from indigenous peoples, leading to their near
extermination, and the transatlantic slave trade, which created a
racial underclass.”36  After watching Spain enrich itself with Ara-
wak gold, other European nations rushed to the Americas for
riches of their own, matching Spanish brutality in their treatment
of the indigenous peoples they encountered.37  Later, the United
States—the world’s last great colonial power38—followed the ex-
ample set by its European predecessors, forcibly removing Na-
tive Americans to ever-shrinking reservations, and carrying forth
genocidal policies well into the twentieth century.39  Nor was
colonialism confined to the Americas.  By the start of the twenti-
34 Id. at 63.  The population of the Americas before European colonization is a
matter of great speculation.  However, there is little disagreement about the fact
that, whatever their original numbers, colonialism brought many indigenous peoples
to or near the brink of extermination. See, e.g. , GETCHES ET AL., CASES AND
MATERIALS ON FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 47 (4th ed. 1998) [hereinafter GETCHES I].
35 LOEWEN, supra  note 1, at 63-64.
36 Id. at 60.
37 Id. at 66.
38 See BLAUT, supra note 1, at 27-28. R
39 See, e.g. , Rennard Strickland, The Genocidal Premise in Native American Law
and Policy: Exorcising Aboriginal Ghosts , 1 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 325, 327-28
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eth century, “all of the non-European world had been carved up
into colonies, semi-colonial spheres of control, and territories of
settlement.”40  Thus, Columbus’ actions, far from being an aber-
ration, merely set an oft-followed colonialist precedent: the en-
slavement or displacement of indigenous peoples and the
appropriation of their lands and resources.
It should be noted that not all European interactions with in-
digenous peoples were motivated by greed.  However, even
where colonialist motives were arguably altruistic—the “saving”
of Indian souls by conversion to Christianity for instance—they
often facilitated a kind of cultural genocide that was, in many
ways, as destructive as physical violence.41  Moreover, inasmuch
as those motives arose from culturally biased notions of indige-
nous peoples’ inferiority, and thus answered to a perceived
“need” for European influence in indigenous peoples’ lives and
cultures,42  they served to justify a European presence in the
Americas that also catered to more sinister colonial interests.43
As U.S. Supreme Court Chief Justice John Marshall wrote in
Johnson v. McIntosh , “[t]he potentates of the old world found no
difficulty in convincing themselves that they made ample com-
pensation to the inhabitants of the new, by bestowing on them
(1998) (discussing Indian removal policies and compulsory sterilization of Native
American women from the 1940s to the 1980s).
40 BLAUT, supra note 1, at 26.  Before the mid-eighteenth century, European R
colonialism was largely confined to the Americas. Id. at 20-22.
41 See Allison M. Dussias, Waging War with Words: Native Americans’ Continuing
Struggle Against the Suppression of Their Languages , 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 901, 948
(1999) (noting the harmful effects of the loss of cultural identity). The United Na-
tions has defined cultural genocide by reference to “[a]ny action which has the aim
or effect of depriving [indigenous peoples] of their integrity as distinct peoples, or of
their cultural values or ethnic identities” and “[a]ny form of assimilation or integra-
tion by other cultures or ways of life imposed on them by legislative, administrative,
or other measures.”  U.N. Human Rights Council, Sub-Comm. on the Prevention of
Discrimination & Prot. of Minorities, Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous
Peoples , para. 7(a), (d), U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1994/2/Add.1, (Aug. 26, 1994),
available at http://www.unhchr.ch/huridocda/huridoca.nsf/(Symbol)/E.CN.4.SUB.2.
RES.1994.45.En?OpenDocument [hereinafter Draft Declaration].
42 See GETCHES I, supra note 34, at 51 (citing the writings of sixteenth century R
Dominican priest and scholar Franciscus de Victoria).
43 See id. ; see also ALLEN P. SLICKPOO, SR. & DEWARD E. WALKER, JR., NOON
NEE-ME-POO (WE, THE NEZ PERCES): CULTURE AND HISTORY OF THE NEZ PERCES
72 (1973) (quoting a Nez Perce tribal member) (“[M]issionaries . . . played an im-
portant role in breaking down our way of life, demoralizing and weakening our cul-
tural values, and ending our power and freedom so that we would be dependant on
the whites.”).
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civilization and Christianity, in exchange for unlimited
independence.”44
European racism cannot be overemphasized as a factor in the
enterprise of colonization.  A strong sense of cultural superiority
(one with a crucial racial component) was at the very heart of
Europeans’ abridgement of indigenous rights, providing an ideo-
logical justification for the appropriation of indigenous lands and
resources.45  Particularly important to the colonial process was
the refusal to recognize indigenous property rights, a refusal
based on the theory that indigenous peoples were in a lower
stage of social evolution, and thus were incapable of grasping Eu-
ropean concepts of individual ownership.46  Colonizers were
loath to consider that indigenous modes of communal ownership
could exist on equal legal footing with European conceptions of
private property—to do so would de-legitimize the colonizers’
very presence in the Americas.  On the other hand, this
marginalization of indigenous property rights legitimized, in the
minds of Europeans, their appropriation of indigenous lands and
resources.47
The refusal to grant equal legal status to indigenous modes of
property ownership, and the racist underpinnings of that refusal,
lay at the heart of what came to be known as the “discovery doc-
trine,” one of the central legal and operational tenets of colonial-
ism.  The doctrine, which was an outgrowth of the same Christian
legal dogma that inspired the Crusades, held that European na-
tions acquired the underlying title to indigenous lands, notwith-
standing the indigenous right of occupancy, by virtue of mere
“discovery.”48  The result that flowed from the doctrine “sharply
diminished the tribes’ former rights of sovereignty and ownership
over their territories.”49
44 Johnson v. McIntosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 573 (1823).
45 See BLAUT, supra note 1, at 20, 26, 61-62; see also  Williams I, supra note 26, at R
358-69 (discussing colonizers’ racially and culturally biased justifications for denying
equal rights and privileges to colonized peoples); id. at 359.  (“[T]he racist focuses
on a perceived difference between himself or herself and the intended victim of
racial discrimination.  The racist perceives this difference as a deficiency: ‘they’ do
not use the land as we do and are therefore less ‘efficient’ . . . .”).
46 BLAUT, supra note 1, at 25.
47 See id.
48 GETCHES I, supra note 34, at 42. The right of occupancy could be extinguished R
by the discovering sovereign through purchase or conquest. See Johnson , 21 U.S. (8
Wheat.) at 588.
49 GETCHES I, supra  note 34, at 42. R
\\server05\productn\O\OEL\21-1\OEL105.txt unknown Seq: 13 10-JAN-07 12:00
2006] Putting the “Sustainable” Back 169
The United States, in seizing the colonial baton from England,
also adopted this conception of indigenous property rights.  In
Johnson v. McIntosh , Chief Justice Marshall affirmed the discov-
ery doctrine,50 thus absorbing into U.S. law centuries of racial
injustice.  This affirmation echoes through history to the present
day, forming a critical legal  link between Columbus’ extermina-
tion of the Arawaks and more recent abuses such as the Trail of
Tears51 and, still more recently, the U.S. government’s alienation
of tribal lands pursuant to its “termination” policy of the 1950s
and 1960s:52
Johnson’s acceptance of the Doctrine of Discovery into
United States law preserved the legacy of 1,000 years of Euro-
pean racism and colonialism directed against non-Western
peoples.  White society’s exercise of power over Indian tribes
received the sanction of the Rule of Law in Johnson v. McIn-
tosh .  The Doctrine of Discovery’s underlying medievally de-
rived ideology—that normatively divergent “savage” peoples
could be denied rights and status equal to those accorded to
the civilized nations of Europe—had become an integral part
of the fabric of United States federal Indian law.  The archi-
tects of an idealized European vision of life in the Indians’
New World had successfully transplanted an Old World form
of legal discourse denying all respect to the Indians’ funda-
mental human rights.  While the tasks of conquest and coloni-
zation had not yet been fully actualized on the entire
American continent, the originary legal rules and principles of
federal Indian law set down by Marshall in Johnson v. McIn-
tosh  and its discourse of conquest ensured that future acts of
genocide would proceed on a rationalized, legal basis.53
50 See Johnson , 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 572-77.
51 See William Bradford, “With a Very Great Blame on Our Hearts”: Reparations,
Reconciliation, and an American Indian Plea for Peace with Justice , 27 AM. INDIAN
L. REV. 1, 23 n.98 (2002/2003) (describing the forced removal of the Cherokees from
their homeland in present-day Georgia to the American West).
52 See GETCHES I, supra note 34, at 11.  For a detailed account of the termination R
policy and its effects on specific tribes, see CHARLES WILKINSON, BLOOD STRUG-
GLE: THE RISE OF MODERN INDIAN NATIONS 57-86 (2005).
53 ROBERT A. WILLIAMS, JR., THE AMERICAN INDIAN IN WESTERN LEGAL
THOUGHT: THE DISCOURSES OF CONQUEST 317 (1990) [hereinafter WILLIAMS II].
Indian law scholars portray Marshall as both hero and goat. Compare, e.g. , Williams
I, supra note 26, at 362 (critically discussing Marshall’s adoption into U.S. law of a R
“medievally derived legal tradition of Christian European crusading conquest”),
with, e.g. , David H. Getches, Conquering the Cultural Frontier: The New Subjectiv-
ism of the Supreme Court in Indian Law , 84 CAL. L. REV. 1573, 1577-83 (1996)
[hereinafter Getches II] (offering a more sympathetic account of Marshall’s reason-
ing and crediting his foundational opinions with the preservation of tribal sover-
eignty under U.S. law).  Given the practical constraints of Marshall’s office, it may
be unfair to ascribe to him sole responsibility for adopting colonialist ideology into
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It is noteworthy that Johnson v. McIntosh  has never been
overruled, and continues to underlie modern conceptions of in-
digenous property rights in the United States.  Even today, the
federal government holds title to most Native American lands
and resources, albeit in “trust” for the tribes.54  As the next sub-
section illustrates, the continuance (in the United States and else-
where) of this fundamental denial of indigenous rights informs
the interactions of the developed world’s “potentates” with the
indigenous societies of today.55
U.S. law.  Although Marshall’s foundational Indian law opinions—often referred to
as the “Marshall trilogy”—acknowledge his discomfort with the discovery doctrine,
see id. at 1577, 1579, n.22, it may have been beyond the practical limits of his power
to reject the legitimacy of colonialist land acquisitions, a step which would have,
after all, undermined the territorial claims of the fledgling government he served.
Indeed, Marshall expressed just such a self-consciousness about the practical limits
of the Court’s power. See Johnson , 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 591 (“However extrava-
gant the pretension of converting the discovery of an inhabited country into con-
quest may appear . . . if the property of the great mass of the community originates
in it, it becomes the law of the land, and cannot be questioned.”); see also id. at 588
(“Conquest gives a title which the Courts of the conqueror cannot deny . . . .”).  In
fact, in preserving some Indian rights, Marshall may have done everything practi-
cally within the power of his office to blunt the impact of colonialist land policies on
tribes. See Getches II, supra , at 1583 (noting that Marshall’s solicitude to tribal
interests in the final installment of his trilogy of Indian law cases—Worcester v.
Georgia—tested the limits of state compliance and incited a constitutional crisis);
see also id. at 1580 n.24 (“It is difficult to imagine the young nation’s Court being
less restrictive of Indian rights in such hotly contested cases.”).
54 See GETCHES I, supra note 34, at 20-21. Although this trust relationship em- R
bodies a clear duty on the part of the federal government to protect the native land
base, Wood, supra note 3, at 1506, it offers uneven protection in practice, and offers
no practical barrier at all to the majority’s political will as channeled through the
U.S. Congress, see id.  at 1508-09.  Congress can—and has—used its “plenary power”
in the area of Indian affairs to transfer tribal lands into non-Indian ownership. See
id.  at 1503 (discussing the plenary power doctrine); see also WILKINSON, supra  note
52, at 43 (discussing the opening of certain “surplus” tribal lands to non-Indian set- R
tlement pursuant to Congress’ allotment policy); id. at xiii, 57-86 (describing Con-
gress’ termination policy, a designed sell-off of tribal lands and assimilation of tribal
peoples).  Although current U.S. policy abandons the “overt land grabbing” of past
policies and substitutes a commitment to tribal autonomy and self-determination,
see Wood, supra note 3, at 1472-74, the possibility that Congress will exercise its R
nearly unlimited power in the area of Indian affairs to direct a policy reversal poses
an ever-present threat to the tribal land base. See WILKINSON, supra  note 52, at 242. R
History suggests the threat is significant: tribes lost almost 90 million acres of land
pursuant to the allotment and termination policies. See id. at 43.
55 See Johnson v. McIntosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 573 (1823); see also GETCHES
I, supra note 34, at 48 (noting the link between sixteenth-century Spanish legal the- R
ory and modern conceptions of indigenous rights).
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B. Neocolonialist Assaults on Indigenous Lands
and Resources
Much has changed since the misdeeds of Columbus.  Indige-
nous-rights advocates have cause for enthusiasm.  In the devel-
oped world, there is a growing awareness of the importance of
cultural diversity,56 overt racism generally is disfavored, and the
belief in Anglo-American cultural supremacy, while still very
much alive, is at least not quite the dogma it was at the peak of
the colonialist era.57  Many major universities offer programs in
ethnic studies or similar fields,58 and “cultural competence” is a
buzzword in the corporate world.59  Indigenous peoples them-
selves are organizing.  They have asserted themselves in domestic
and international law and policy,60 and have begun to claim legal
rights and protections not extended to their ancestors.61  Move-
ments are afoot around the world to strengthen and protect in-
digenous cultures.  In the United States, Native Americans, after
a bleak history of removal from their ancestral lands and forced
assimilation into Anglo-American culture,62 are revitalizing their
56 A Google search for the term “cultural diversity” returned 9,510,000 results,
http://www.google.com/search?hl=en&lr=&q=%22cultural+diversity%22 (last vis-
ited Oct. 21, 2006).
57 See BLAUT, supra note 1, at 29-30, 52. R
58 See, e.g. , University of Oregon, Ethnic Studies Program, (Oct. 2005), http://
darkwing.uoregon.edu/~ethnic/.
59 See Diversity Training University International, http://www.dtui.com/bec_
trainer.html (last visited Sept. 25 2006).  In recent affirmative-action cases before the
U.S. Supreme Court, major corporations such as General Motors filed amicus briefs
on behalf of the defendant university in favor  of affirmative-action programs. See
e.g. , Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 330-31 (2003).
60 See, e.g. , Inter-Am. C.H.R., Third Report on the Human Rights Situation in
Colombia , ch. X, para. 6, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.102, doc. 9 rev. 1, (Feb. 26, 1999), availa-
ble at http://www.cidh.org/countryrep/Colom99en/chapter-10.htm [hereinafter Co-
lombia Report]; see also Siegfried Wiessner, Rights and Status of Indigenous Peoples:
A Global Comparative and International Legal Analysis , 12 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 57,
58 (1999).
61 Compare, e.g. , Awas Tingni Case, 2001 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., (ser. C) No. 79,
para. 148 (Aug. 31, 2001) available at http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/ articulos/
seriec_79_ing.pdf (holding that the right to property extends to the communal prop-
erty of indigenous peoples), with, e.g. , Johnson v. McIntosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543,
572-77 (1823) (affirming the discovery doctrine relegating indigenous property
rights to a mere right of occupancy).
62 See Arthur Manuel & Nicole Schabus, Indigenous Peoples at the Margin of the
Global Economy: A Violation of International Human Rights and International
Trade Law , 8 CHAP. L. REV. 229, 232-33 (2005) (discussing President Andrew Jack-
son’s order directing the forced removal of 17,000 Cherokees from Georgia, their
walk from Georgia to Oklahoma being more commonly known as the “Trail of
Tears”).
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traditional cultures under a new era of “self-determination.”63  In
the Brazilian Amazon, efforts are underway to chart the territo-
ries of the few remaining “uncontacted” indigenous tribes, so as
to better protect their lands from outside encroachment.64
But these positive developments should be noted only with an
eye to the preceding 500-year history of colonial abuses.  During
that period, colonizers destroyed, altered, or appropriated nearly
all the indigenous world.65  Moreover, much has not  changed
since Columbus’ time.  Indigenous peoples today often are sub-
jected to abuses similar to those perpetrated on the Arawaks by
Columbus: outside appropriators invade indigenous territories
and seize resources, decimating the local environments and cul-
tures in the process.  These abuses can be traced to the same fun-
damental lack of respect for indigenous property rights that
prevailed among European colonizers in the sixteenth century.66
It makes little difference if the intrusions into indigenous territo-
ries that once came in the form of military invasions now come as
transnational corporate ventures.  To the indigenous victims of
modernization,67 the result under this latter type of “economic”
colonialism is often the same: death, disease, poverty, and cul-
tural disruption.68
63 See GETCHES I, supra note 34, at 230-33; WILKINSON, supra  note 52, at xiii-xiv, R
189, 352-53; Blaine Harden, Walking the Land With Pride Once More: Tribal Re-
newal Sparks Wealth, Optimism , WASH. POST, Sept. 19, 2004, at A1, available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A31334-2004Sep18.html.
64 See, e.g. , Wallace, supra  note 19, at 9-10. R
65 See supra Part I.A.
66 See, e.g. , Manuel & Schabus, supra  note 62, at 242 (discussing the threat to R
indigenous peoples posed by transnational corporations seeking to expropriate
traditional indigenous lands under international trade agreements); see also Pro-
posed Declaration , supra note 4, at pmbl. para. 2 (“Concerned about the frequent R
deprivation afflicting indigenous peoples of their human rights and fundamental
freedoms; within and outside their communities, as well as the dispossession of their
lands, territories and resources.”).
67 See BLAUT, supra  note 1, at 28. R
68 See, e.g. , Brazil Report , supra note 3, at paras. 22, 33, 63, 65.  This is not to R
suggest that indigenous peoples, even now, are free of the former type of outright
military hostility.  In this regard, see, for example, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Fifth Report on
the Situation of Human Rights in Guatemala , ch. XI, paras. 9-16 OEA/Ser.L/V/
II.111, doc. 21 rev. (Apr. 6, 2001), available at  http://www.cidh.org/countryrep/
Guate01eng/chap.11.htm, detailing the Guatemalan government’s former counter-
insurgency policy.  Where indigenous peoples were thought to be aiding guerilla
forces, the Guatemalan military slaughtered entire villages, including children and
the elderly. Id.  at para. 14.  The disproportionately heavy-handed response was
aimed “not only at destroying the social bases of the guerillas, but also at destroying
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Periodic country reports by the Inter-American Commission
on Human Rights (Commission) describe the human-rights situa-
tions of the indigenous peoples of Organization of American
States (OAS) member countries.  These reports frequently detail
the conditions of indigenous peoples, and paint a vivid picture of
the modern pressures and challenges faced by indigenous peo-
ples of the Americas.  Of particular interest here are the Com-
mission’s reports regarding invasions of indigenous property
interests by outside appropriators.
For example, in its 2000 report on Peru, the Commission de-
scribed the “large-scale” exploitation of natural resources and
raw materials in indigenous territories within the Peruvian jun-
gle: “The actions of the lumber and oil companies in these areas,
without consulting or obtaining the consent of the communities
affected, in many cases lead to environmental degradation and
endanger the survival of these peoples.”69  The Commission’s use
of the term “survival” implicitly references cultural as well as
physical survival, given its finding that, “[t]he recovery, recogni-
tion, demarcation, and registration of the [indigenous] lands rep-
resents [sic] essential rights for cultural survival and for
maintaining the community’s integrity.”70
Likewise, in its 1999 report on Columbia, the Commission
noted a variety of pressures on indigenous lands.  Despite state
policies allowing indigenous groups to register lands as protected
“resguardos,”71 indigenous peoples faced encroachment by set-
tlers and non-indigenous farmers.  Some of these efforts were
linked to political attempts to appropriate indigenous lands, and
included violence, death threats, and even assassinations of indig-
enous leaders.72  Indigenous peoples faced other threats to their
territories as well, including attempts by transnational and na-
tional oil companies to drill on resguardos (allegedly without
seeking legally required consultations with indigenous communi-
ties),73 and government plans for certain infrastructure improve-
the cultural values that fostered cohesion and collective action in the indigenous
communities.” Id. at para. 16.
69 Inter-Am. C.H.R., Second Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Peru , ch.
X, para. 26 OEA/Ser.L/V/II.106, doc. 59 rev. (June 2, 2000), available at http://
www.cidh.org/countryrep/Peru2000en/chapter10.htm [hereinafter Peru Report].
70 Id. at para. 16.
71 Colombia Report , supra note 60, at para. 16. R
72 Id. at paras. 22-27.
73 Id. at para. 32.
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ments on indigenous lands.  The Commission noted that these
“megaprojects” threaten natural-resource reserves on indigenous
lands and “entail hazards that could prove fatal to the survival of
the indigenous peoples that live in [the affected] areas.”74
The Commission’s 1997 report on Brazil reveals a similar, but
more extensive, list of threats to the Yanomami people, including
mercury pollution from mining, encroachments by squatters and
miners, illegal exploitation of lumber and agriculture, an insuffi-
cient land base to support subsistence activities, epidemics intro-
duced by outsiders, infrastructure improvements deep into
indigenous territories, attacks by immigrants, establishment of
non-indigenous settlements, and—exacerbating all other
problems—judicial and political erosion of indigenous rights.75
The Commission also identified threats to isolated indigenous
groups, noting that, in one instance, cattle ranchers almost en-
tirely “eliminated” two previously uncontacted groups.76
The Commission’s report shows that the convergence of
outside pressures on the indigenous peoples of Brazil are threat-
ening their land base, and thus their “physical and cultural sur-
vival . . . along with protection of the ecology.”77  The
Commission concluded that the state was offering grossly insuffi-
cient protection from these encroachments:
[The] integrity [of the Yanomami] as a people and as individu-
als is under constant attack by both invading prospectors and
the environmental pollution they create.  State protection
against these constant pressures and invasions is irregular and
feeble, so that they are constantly in danger and their environ-
ment is suffering constant deterioration.78
Because the Inter-American Commission’s jurisdiction is over
state actors, and not private defendants,79 its reports tend to fo-
cus on the responsibilities of OAS member countries (and the
conditions of indigenous peoples within those countries), rather
than on the actions of specific corporations.  Richard L. Herz
provides an up-close look at these actions:
74 Id. at para. 33.
75 Brazil Report , supra note 3, at paras. 22, 33, 63, 65; see also  Wallace, supra  note R
19, at 9-10, 17-19 (describing the destructive effects of outside interferences on the R
indigenous cultures of the Brazilian Amazon).
76 Brazil Report , supra note 3, at para. 24.
77 Id. at para. 63.
78 Id. at para. 82(f).
79 See HUNTER ET AL., supra note 7 at 1333 n.1. R
\\server05\productn\O\OEL\21-1\OEL105.txt unknown Seq: 19 10-JAN-07 12:00
2006] Putting the “Sustainable” Back 175
All too often, transnational corporations (TNCs) and govern-
ments inflict devastating environmental harms on local people
in developing countries.  Typically, the damage is obvious and
preventable, but ignored by those who cause it. Texaco’s oil
development in the Ecuadorian Amazon . . . [is a] noteworthy
example[ ].  Texaco drilled oil in the Ecuadorian Amazon for
twenty years, ending in 1992.  During that time, the company
opened over 300 wells and cut 18,000 miles of trail and 300
miles of road in pristine rainforest.  Disregarding the estab-
lished industry practice of pumping wastes back into wells,
Texaco dumped massive quantities of toxic byproducts onto
roads and into streams and wetlands local people used for
drinking, fishing and bathing.  Texaco also filled over 600 pits
with toxic waste, which often washed out in heavy rain.  A
farmer, describing the rupture of just one of these pits, stated,
“[i]t has been three years, and my wife is still covered with
rashes.  I have eight children.  All of them have been sick with
rashes, flus, their stomachs, swollen throats.  We did not have
that before the spill.”  The rupture also ruined his farm and
water supply.  At least 30,000 people have suffered injuries
similar to those experienced by that farmer and his family as a
result of Texaco’s Amazonian operations.80
Herz goes on to describe Freeport-McMoRan’s “equally outra-
geous” copper and gold mining operation in the highlands of
West Papua (Irian Jaya), Indonesia.81  The New Orleans-based
company is in the process of strip-mining a mountain sacred to
the indigenous Amungme people.82  Every day, the company
dumps hundreds of thousands of tons of untreated toxic mine
tailings directly into local waterways,83 producing an aggregate
discharge of nearly 1 billion tons as of December 2005.84  The
discharges are so massive they literally are burying local ecosys-
tems in waste rock and mine tailings.85  Sludge “the consistency
and color of wet cement, belts down the rivers, and inundates
and smothers all in its path.”86  These enormous releases of sedi-
ment already have dramatically altered the landscape, but the
damage has only begun—Freeport estimates it will discharge an
80 Herz, supra note 3, at 547-48 (internal citations omitted). R
81 See id.  at 548.
82 Id. ; Jane Perlez & Raymond Bonner, Below a Mountain of Wealth, a River of
Waste , N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 27, 2005, at A1, available at  http://www.nytimes.com/2005/
12/27/international/asia/27gold.html?ex=1293339600&en=fba5e5cb626e7d5c&ei=50
88&partner=rssnyt&emc=rss.
83 Herz, supra note 3, at 547-48.
84 See Perlez & Bonner, supra note 82. R
85 Id.
86 Id.
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additional 5 billion tons of waste before closing the mine.87
Given the severity of the destruction already done, dumping such
a massive additional quantity of waste into the local environment
could be truly catastrophic.  So far, Freeport’s operation has dev-
astated lakes, polluted ground and surface water, destroyed a
coastal estuary, instigated mass die-offs of vegetation, and left
local rivers barren of life.88  The company has radically disrupted
Amungme culture as well.  When Freeport’s explorers first ar-
rived in the 1960s, they encountered a self-sustaining indigenous
community almost totally isolated from outside contact.89  In ab-
ruptly replacing this community with “an entirely new society
and economy, all of its own making,”90 Freeport virtually en-
sured the Amungmes’ economic dependence on the company.91
Thus, while the Amungme now rely on Freeport for “economic
viability,”92 the company’s operations ultimately have
“threatened the lives and health of the entire Amungme people,
through starvation, exposure to toxic chemicals, pollution of their
water, and destruction of their lands.”93
87 Id.
88 Id. ; Herz, supra note 3, at 547-48.
89 See Perlez & Bonner, supra note 82; Paul Raeburn et al., Whose Globe? , BUS. R
WK., Nov. 6, 2000, at 88; see also Michelle Conlin et al., The Corporate Donors , BUS.
WK., Dec. 1, 2003, at 92 (noting that the Amungme tribe has inhabited the island for
thousands of years).
90 Perlez & Bonner, supra note 82; see also Carolyn D. Cook, Papuan Gold, A R
Blessing of a Curse? The Case of the Amungmes , CULTURAL SURVIVAL Q., Spring
2001, at 44, available at http://209.200.101.189/publications/csq/csq-article.cfm?id=
653&highlight=Amungme (describing the cultural disruption surrounding the re-
placement of the Amungmes’ traditional barter economy with a market economy).
91 See Perlez & Bonner, supra note 82; Raeburn et al., supra note 89. An ulti- R
mately unsuccessful lawsuit filed in U.S. federal court under the Alien Tort Statute
and the Torture Victim Protection Act alleged that Freeport had engaged in “cul-
tural genocide.”  Beanal v. Freeport-McMoran, Inc., 197 F.3d 161, 163 (5th Cir.
1999).
92 Raeburn et al., supra note 89. R
93 Herz, supra note 3, at 548.  In response to escalating discontent, which R
culminated in a series of riots in 1996, Freeport eventually began making substantial
monetary investments in the local community.  Conlin et al, supra note 89.  While R
these investments (one percent of local annual revenues) may be generous by indus-
try standards, critics assert they are de minimis “greenwash” compared to the envi-
ronmental harms the company has caused. See id.  Moreover, not all of Freeport’s
investments are so savory: the company reportedly has issued millions of dollars in
payouts to Indonesian military officials, ostensibly to provide “security,” but with
the effect of maintaining a network of political and military ties that help shield the
company from pressures to change its environmental practices. See Perlez & Bon-
ner, supra note 82.  Finally, any local need for Freeport’s money exists in the first
place because the company abruptly replaced a self-sustaining indigenous economy
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The examples from these various sources are strikingly similar
in motive and result to Columbus’ treatment of the Arawaks in
1492: outside appropriators disregard the territorial rights of in-
digenous occupants and invade their lands, extract their
resources, and/or establish “settlements.”  Usually the appropria-
tors profit mightily, and usually the indigenous peoples suffer dis-
ruption of their cultures, ecologies, and economies.  Often,
indigenous peoples suffer from disease or pollution.  Sometimes
they are victims of intentional violence.  Occasionally, entire
populations disappear.  Not even indigenous cultural or intellec-
tual property is safe.  Drug manufacturers transform indigenous
medicinal knowledge into millions of dollars,94 and corporations
use images of Indians to market everything from cigarettes to
sour cream.95
One might rightfully ask: what has changed in the 450 years
since the last living Arawak walked the beaches of Haiti?  For
indigenous peoples the sad answer is, precious little.  Colonial-
ism, in a new form, continues its steady genocidal march through
the ages.96  It is true that indigenous peoples today generally are
with an economy dependant on its mining operation. See id. With respect to this
dramatic transformation, see also Raeburn et al., supra note 89 (alluding to the R
Amungmes’ prior self-sufficiency, but noting that they presently “see the mine . . . as
their only means of economic viability”).
94 See HUNTER ET AL., supra note 7, at 964-65; see also “Sharing” the Wealth? R
Minerals, Oil, Timber, and Now Medicines and Genetic Wealth—All Are Fair Game
for Governments and Corporations , CULTURAL SURVIVAL Q., Fall 1991, at 30, 37
(discussing “scientific poaching”).
95 See Angela R. Riley, “Straight Stealing”: Towards an Indigenous System of Cul-
tural Property Protection , 80 WASH. L. REV. 69, 76 (2005).
96 In a way, neocolonialism is even more sinister than “classical” colonialism be-
cause present-day harms to indigenous peoples tend to occur behind the scenes.  In
Columbus’ time, colonization was carried on in such a way that its effects on indige-
nous peoples created a visible moral dilemma that fostered vigorous debate about
Europeans’ ethical responsibilities. See GETCHES I, supra note 34, at 48-52; see also R
LOEWEN, supra  note 1, at 67-68.  Presently, despite some intermittent concern about R
issues such as sweat-shop labor, indigenous peoples’ treatment at the hands of trans-
national corporations largely flies under the public radar (although, concededly, this
may be changing). See Raeburn et al., supra note 89 (noting that an emerging ac- R
tivist movement is forcing a reversal of transnationals’ former indifference to Third
World environmental and human-rights issues); Conlin et al., supra note 89 (noting R
the internet’s role in increasing public awareness and activism).  But for the most
part, to the extent of their awareness of the issue, people in the developed world
tend to regard globalization as a positive  influence. See BLAUT, supra  note 1, at 2, R
28-29 (discussing the belief in the diffusion of modernization).  This belief appears to
be grounded more in ideology than in fact.  As this article illustrates at length, trans-
national corporations and governments involved in resource extraction visit very
real harms on indigenous peoples and their lands.
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granted more legal rights than those of Columbus’ time; how-
ever, even assuming they can enforce those rights, they are often
limited in application to state actors.97  Transnational corpora-
tions, in particular, often operate in the gaps left by international
and domestic legal regimes, gaps the free-trade era has only
widened.98
One thing has  changed: the world is smaller.  In the centuries
following Columbus’ voyage, the emerging global economy had
room to grow.  For Europeans, there were always new “fron-
tiers,” new resources to be tapped, new peoples to be subdued.
By the start of the twentieth century, this was no longer true.
The frontiers had all been claimed.99  One hundred years after
that, the global economy has begun to outgrow not only the
earth’s physical frontiers, but also its ecological limits.100  Even as
neocolonialist enterprises encroach on the remaining indigenous
lands and scrape away at the last reservoirs of unappropriated
resources, the international community has awakened to a com-
pelling new need: environmental “sustainability.”
II
THE FAILINGS OF THE “SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT” MODEL
OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
Colonization created new markets and tapped new resources,
laying the groundwork for the rise of the modern global econ-
omy.  Resource-intensive development, industrialization, and
consumerism became the pathway to prosperity in the developed
world, an approach that has carried over to present times.  Only
recently has the global community begun to catalogue and attack
the environmental problems created by this economic ap-
proach.101  There has arisen an awareness that unrestrained de-
velopment can irreparably destroy the ecosystems supplying the
97 This is the case with the Inter-American System, discussed in Part IV, infra , and
with most of international law. See, e.g. , Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726
F.2d 774, 794 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (per curiam) (Edwards, J., concurring); id. at 805-06
(Bork, J., concurring).
98 See Herz, supra note 3, at 548; Manuel & Schabus, supra  note 62, at 241-42 R
(describing how the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) has weak-
ened legal protections for indigenous property and has helped open indigenous
lands to transnational corporations).
99 See BLAUT, supra note 1, at 26. R
100 See Brown II, supra note 9, at 4. R
101 See HUNTER ET AL., supra note 7, at 170-71. R
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resources for development in the first place.102  Accordingly, gov-
ernments increasingly have recognized a need to throttle back on
development and control its harmful side effects (such as pollu-
tion), and thus manage development in a way that allows pros-
perity to continue into future generations.103  The idea has
manifested itself in international environmental law as the princi-
ple of “sustainable development.”104
In 1987, the World Commission on Environment and Develop-
ment (the Brundtland Commission) famously defined sustainable
development as “development that meets the needs of the pre-
sent without compromising the ability of future generations to
meet their own needs.”105  This definition is notorious for its
vagueness, and many have tried to improve it or infuse it with
specific operational standards.106  For purposes of this discussion,
however, it is enough to invoke the Brundtland Commission’s
lowest common denominator: “At a minimum, sustainable devel-
opment must not endanger the natural systems that support life
on Earth: the atmosphere, the waters, the soils, and the living
beings.”107
Clearly, despite the emergence of sustainable development as
the  organizational concept in international environmental law,108
it has thus far not succeeded in achieving even that minimum
result.  Lester Brown highlights the growing cost of the devel-
oped world’s prosperity and catalogues the substantial and grow-
ing environmental problems facing humankind in the new
millennium:
Caught up in [the] economic excitement [of the economic ex-
pansion of the 1990s], we seem to have lost sight of the deteri-
oration of environmental systems and resources.  The contrast
102 See WORLD COMM’N ON ENV’T AND DEV., supra  note 15, at 44-45; Brown II, R
supra note 9, at 8-9. R
103 See, e.g. , Rio Declaration , supra note 16, at princ. 3. R
104 See, e.g. , id. at princ. 4.
105 WORLD COMM’N ON ENV’T & DEV., supra  note 15, at 43. R
106 See , e.g. , Nanda, supra note 14, at 55; HUNTER ET AL., supra note 7, at 184 n.1 R
(citing various formulations of sustainable development).
107 WORLD COMM’N ON ENV’T & DEV., supra  note 15, at 44-45.  Of course the R
tension between the concepts embodied by the terminology can easily be resolved to
yield precisely the opposite formulation: “If sustainable development means any-
thing in practical terms, it means that environmental protection cannot destroy the
economic foundation of a community.” HUNTER ET AL., supra note 7, at 266. R
108 See, e.g. , Nanda, supra note 14, at 54 (referring to sustainable development as R
the “international paradigm for the new millennium”); see also HUNTER ET AL.,
supra note 7, at 208-09. R
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between our bright hopes for the future of the information
economy and the deterioration of Earth’s ecosystem leaves us
with a schizophrenic outlook.
Although the contrast between our civilization and that of our
hunter-gatherer ancestors could scarcely be greater, we do
have one thing in common—we, too, depend entirely on
Earth’s natural systems and resources to sustain us.  Unfortu-
nately, the expanding global economy that is driving the Dow
Jones to new highs is, as currently structured, outgrowing
those ecosystems.  Evidence of this can be seen in shrinking
forests, eroding soils, falling water tables, collapsing fisheries,
rising temperatures, dying coral reefs, melting glaciers, and
disappearing plant and animal species.109
Disturbingly, these trends have continued, despite interna-
tional awareness of environmental problems and international
and domestic law focused on sustainable development.110  The
question is, why?  Certainly, there appears to be a disconnect be-
tween the theory of sustainable development and actual eco-
nomic practice.  Part of the problem is the global community’s
struggle to achieve effective implementation of the sustainable-
development concept.111  But this in turn begs the question of
what, beyond the concept’s inherent ambiguity, makes imple-
menting sustainable development so difficult?
There are many possible answers to that question ranging from
the legal to the logistical.  The one I propose here is one part
economics and one part ideology.  First, the global market system
has become unsustainable because its supply and demand com-
ponents respond to short-term market forces as if underlying re-
sources were infinite.  In other words, the market does not
respond naturally to ecological limits.  Brown describes this
process:
The market is a remarkably efficient device for allocating re-
sources and for balancing supply and demand, but it does not
respect the sustainable yield thresholds of natural systems.  In
a world where demands of the economy are pressing against
the limits of natural systems, relying exclusively on economic
indicators to guide investment decisions is a recipe for disas-
ter.  Historically, for example, if the supply of fish was inade-
quate, the price would rise, encouraging investment in
109 Brown II, supra note 9, at 4.  Brown goes on to discuss these negative environ- R
mental trends in detail. See id. at 5-8; see also HUNTER ET AL., supra note 7, at 1-8. R
110 See generally Nanda, supra note 14. R
111 See id. at 62-63; see also id. at 70-71 (noting mixed success in achieving sustain-
able development goals, particularly with respect to the contributions of the devel-
oped world).
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additional fishing trawlers.  This market system worked well.
But today, with the fish catch already exceeding the sustaina-
ble yield of many fisheries, investing in more trawlers in re-
sponse to higher seafood prices will simply accelerate the
collapse of fisheries.  A similar situation exists with forests,
rangelands, and aquifers.112
That market forces evolved without reference to the limits of
natural-resource pools certainly is not surprising, given that
colonialism was continually infusing the economy with new
lands, resources, and capital.  However, as the expanding global
economy strains the earth’s capacity to generate further infusions
of resources, the entire system faces an inward collapse.113  Of
course, Brown’s description of market forces does not account
for artificially imposed limits, such as taxation, licensing, and reg-
ulation.  In fact, it is tools such as these that Brown ultimately
suggests can instill the system with sustainability.114
But therein lies the problem.  The market forces Brown de-
scribes are unconscious and reactionary.  Counterweights such as
taxation or regulation require forethought, deliberation, consen-
sus, and political will.115  It follows that, where market forces col-
lide with ecological limits, the market is predisposed to follow—
of its own momentum—an unsustainable path, even in the face
of concerted efforts to reign it in.
And this is where ideology comes in.  J.M. Blaut suggests that
the developed world still believes too strongly in the enduring
colonialist myth of European cultural superiority to reject the so-
cioeconomic model that has for so long been at the center of the
myth.116  Intuitively, this seems correct.  Development and eco-
nomic growth are answers, not problems.  Indicators of economic
growth make and break political careers (recall, for instance, the
“It’s the economy stupid” sound byte of the 1992 U.S. presiden-
tial campaign).117  This is not to say that the developed world
112 Brown II, supra note 9, at 9. R
113 See id. at 8-9, 10.
114 See id. at 18-19 (discussing countries that have modified their tax structure to
reduce taxes on income and increase taxation on environmentally destructive
activities).
115 See id. at 10 (discussing the difficulty of overcoming political inertia).
116 See BLAUT, supra note 1, at 28-29.  According to Blaut, the developed world
holds that model responsible for its prosperity, and seeks “diffusion” of its benefits
to the developing world. Id.
117 To refresh your memory, see Edwin J. Fuelner, “It’s The Economy, Stupid,”
Circa 1996 , HERITAGE FOUNDATION, May 16, 1996, http://www.heritage.org/Press/
Commentary/ED051696b.cfm.
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rejects the principle  of sustainability—clearly it does not—but it
seems unlikely the principle ever will influence, absent wide-
spread public perception of an immediate and compelling threat,
any curtailment of development that stagnates economic
growth.118
III
RECOGNIZING AND ENFORCING INDIGENOUS PROPERTY
RIGHTS AS A PATHWAY TO SUSTAINABILITY
Since “inside-out” market reforms (e.g., taxation and regula-
tion) are unlikely to succeed alone, other approaches are needed
to achieve environmental sustainability.  Expanding the universe
of international law protective of indigenous property rights is
critical to these efforts.119  For all of the reasons so far discussed,
such a step strikes at the very foundations of colonialism.  For
118 See Brown II, supra note 9, at 10-11 (discussing the factors motivating political R
change); see also HUNTER ET AL., supra  note 7, at 186 (quoting C. Raghavan, The
Long March From Stockholm 72 to Rio 92, TERRA VIVA, June 3, 1992, at 8-9).
Raghavan discusses the political difficulty of seeking painful or dramatic change:
Ecological constraints are real and more growth for the poor must be bal-
anced by negative throughput growth for the rich . . . Politically, it is very
difficult to face up to the need for income redistribution and population
stability.  If the concept of sustainable development becomes a verbal
formula for glossing over these harsh realities then it will have been a big
step backwards.
119 Currently, there is only one binding international treaty solely addressing in-
digenous rights. See International Labour Organization, Convention Concerning In-
digenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries, No. 169 , June 27, 1989, 72
ILO Official Bull. 59, entered into force Sept. 5, 1991, available at  http://
www.ilo.org/ilolex/english/convdisp1.htm [hereinafter ILO 169].  While ILO 169
contains strong protections for indigenous property rights, see id. at art. 13-19, fewer
than twenty countries have ratified it. See International Labor Organization, Con-
vention No. C169 was Ratified by 17 Countries  (2005), http://www.ilo.org/ ilolex/cgi-
lex/ratifce.pl?C169.  In a field of law that depends so heavily on norm building, con-
sensus, and custom, see HUNTER ET AL., supra note 7, at 273, 313-16, 367, overlap- R
ping treaty regimes are important to the creation of truly binding standards of
national conduct. See id. at 313 (discussing the role of treaties in creating binding
customary international law) (“As the number of treaties and declarations that in-
corporate [a] rule increases, the argument becomes stronger that an international
consensus is emerging.”). However, even absent further binding treaties, there is a
growing consensus that general international legal principles exist regarding indige-
nous property rights. See, e.g. , Mary and Carrie Dann v. United States, Case 11.140,
Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 75/02, OEA/Ser.L/II.117, doc. 5 rev. 1 paras. 129-30
(2002), available at  http://www.cidh.org/annualrep/2002eng/ USA.11140.htm [herein-
after Dann Case] (emphasizing the emergence of  “general international legal princi-
ples”).  Nevertheless, frequent and continuing abuses of indigenous rights militate
for further efforts in this area.
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centuries, the global market economy has gorged itself on fresh
infusions of lands, resources, and capital by denying indigenous
peoples their basic property rights.  In so doing, it has expanded
to nearly every corner of the globe, instilling not just a market
system, but a market ideology .  As that ideology butts up against
the planet’s ecological limits, the global economy nonetheless
continues to feed.  Recognizing and enforcing indigenous prop-
erty rights helps close the buffet, both by serving as a prophylac-
tic limit on the appropriative reach of global markets, and by
rejecting neocolonialist economic ideologies in favor of alter-
nate—sustainable—approaches.
If colonialist and neocolonialist expansions into indigenous
territories have promoted unsustainable environmental practices,
it stands to reason that halting and redressing those expansions
will have the opposite effect.120  But one need not rely on that
assumption.  Countering colonialist expansionism with interna-
tional protections for indigenous property rights furthers the goal
of environmental sustainability in at least two specific ways: (1)
by shielding indigenous lands and resources from non-indigenous
appropriators, and (2) by preserving indigenous cultural systems
best suited to the sustainable management of those lands and re-
sources.  Moreover, endorsing such protections marks an impor-
tant symbolic rejection of colonialist law and practice, militates
against the assimilative economic and cultural effects of global-
ization, and reinforces indigenous peoples’ basic human rights.
A. Prophylactic Benefits of Indigenous Property Rights
First, international recognition and enforcement of indigenous
property rights closes off vast territories and resource pools from
outright appropriation by the world’s largest consumers.121
When corporations invade indigenous territories and extract nat-
ural resources, they often act with the permission, tacit or other-
120 Cf. HUNTER ET AL., supra note 7, at 1281, 1286, 1292 (noting the correlation R
between sustainable development and human rights generally).
121 For instance, a dispute between the Maya people and Belize involved the
state’s grant of logging and oil concessions on more than 700,000 acres of land. See
Maya Indigenous Communities and Their Members Against Belize, Case 12.053,
Inter-Am. C.H.R. Report No. 78/00, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.111, doc. 20 rev. paras. 34, 36.
(2000), available at  http://www.cidh.org/annualrep/2000eng/ChapterIII/Admissible/
Belize12.053.htm [hereinafter Belize Admissibility Decision].
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wise, of national governments.122  This is especially true of
transnational corporations in the free-trade era.123  International
protections for indigenous property rights address this problem
by affording indigenous communities legal recourse against na-
tional governments that participate or acquiesce in such intru-
sions,124 and by providing an alternative avenue of relief where
domestic legal systems prove inadequate.125
Thus, where a state grants a logging concession on an indige-
nous community’s lands, the community can seek to enjoin the
state’s violation of its property rights under international law,
thereby shielding its lands from an environmentally destructive
activity.126  A less dramatic level of protection results where an
122 See, e.g. , Awas Tingni Case, 2001 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., (ser. C) No. 79, para. 103
(Aug. 31, 2001), available at http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/ ser-
iec_79_ing.pdf (challenge to the state’s grant of a logging concession on indigenous
lands); Maya Indigenous Community of the Toledo District v. Belize, Case 12.053,
Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 40/04, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.122 doc. 5 rev. 1 para. 2
(2004), available at  http://www.cidh.org/annualrep/2004eng/ Belize.12053eng.htm
[hereinafter Maya Case] (challenge to state’s grant of logging and oil concessions on
indigenous lands); see also Colombia Report , supra note 60, at paras. 31-32 (describ- R
ing an alleged cooperative effort between a state-owned oil company and interna-
tional oil companies to engage in drilling on indigenous lands); Perlez & Bonner,
supra note 82 (discussing the close ties between the Indonesian military and the R
Freeport-McMoRan mining operation that has devastated the Amungmes’ ancestral
homelands); Brazil Report , supra note 3, at paras. 33, 82(f) (noting the state’s failure R
to prevent encroachments on indigenous lands).
123 See Manuel & Schabus, supra  note 62, at 242. R
124 Generally, international law does not provide redress against non-state actors.
See, e.g. , Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 794 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (per
curiam) (Edwards, J., concurring); id. at 805-06 (Bork, J., concurring).  However,
state actors may be broadly liable for their own inaction related to the illegal acts of
a third party, for example, by failing to exercise due diligence in preventing, investi-
gating, or remedying such acts. See Vela´squez Rodrı´guez Case, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R.
(ser. C) No. 4, para. 172 (July 29, 1988), available at http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/
casos/articulos/seriec_04_ing.pdf.
125 Brazil Report , supra note 3, at paras. 33, 82(f) (noting the state’s failure to R
maintain and enforce applicable domestic legal protections).
126 See, e.g. , Case of the Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community v. Nicaragua,
Order of the Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Provisional Measures of Sept. 6, 2002, available at
http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/medidas/mayagna_se_01_ing.pdf [hereinafter Awas
Tingni Order] (ordering Nicaragua to take preventative measures to halt third-party
resource extraction on indigenous lands).  The community would first need to ex-
haust all adequate domestic remedies. See, e.g. , Maya Case , Case 12.053, Inter-Am.
C.H.R., Report No. 40/04 at para. 175 (alluding to principle, but noting an exception
where the state fails to provide an effective judicial remedy).  In some instances,
principles of nuisance law may further extend this protection beyond the physical
boundaries of indigenous territories.  For example, an indigenous community might
obtain an injunction under a nuisance theory where the state permits third-party
actions near indigenous lands that unreasonably interfere with the community’s use
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indigenous community consents127 to resource extraction or de-
velopment on or near its lands but leverages its property rights to
win concessions (such as payment of fees or restrictions on the
scope or impact of the activity).128  Using the logging example
above, an indigenous community might allow only selective cut-
ting or might prohibit cutting in areas of cultural, economic, or
spiritual significance.  Thus, depending on the manner in which
indigenous communities exert their property rights (i.e., to ex-
clude or to condition entry), their protective effect may vary
from absolute prevention to various levels of mitigation to, per-
haps, mere delay.129  However, by interposing a legal barrier in
and enjoyment of its property. Cf . Lo´pez Ostra v. Spain, 20 Eur. H.R. Rep. 277,
289-90 (1994) (finding the state in violation of the privacy rights protected by Article
8 of the European Convention on Human Rights for allowing the operation of a
waste-treatment plant twelve meters from plaintiff’s home).  While not a case in-
volving indigenous property, the principle applied in Lo´pez Ostra represents an in-
novative analogy to nuisance principles in international law.
127 Of course the appropriate standard should be nothing less than full, informed
consent. See, e.g. , Proposed Declaration , supra note 4, at art. XIII, para. 7; see also R
Maya Case , Case 12.053, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 40/04 at para. 117 (asserting
that indigenous communities have a right not to be deprived of the use and occupa-
tion of their lands and resources “except with fully informed consent, under condi-
tions of equality, and with fair compensation”) (citing Dann Case, Case 11.140,
Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 75/02, OEA/Ser.L/II.117, doc. 5 rev. 1 para. 131
(2002), available at  http://www.cidh.org/annualrep/2002eng/USA.11140.htm).
128 Cf. Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 14 (1982) (discussing an
indigenous tribe’s right to condition entry to its reservation under U.S. domestic
law); Colombia Report , supra note 60, at para. 31 (noting the right of indigenous R
peoples under Colombian domestic law to enter into agreements restricting mining
activities in their territories to certain areas).
129 If an indigenous community were to allow resource extraction on its lands
solely in exchange for payment, there would be no environmental benefit, only a
possible delay for negotiations.  Indeed, it is not uncommon for indigenous peoples
to engage in economic development activities, some of which may prove to be envi-
ronmentally damaging.  For instance, many tribes in the United States have
partnered with non-Indian industrial interests to pursue developments on their res-
ervations, including mines, waste-dumps, and incinerators. See Wood, supra note 3, R
at 1483-86.  However, these initiatives are deeply controversial within Indian Coun-
try, id.  at 1486-89, and it can generally be assumed that tribes will pursue develop-
ment in at least partial accordance with their pre-colonial customs, traditions, and
beliefs. See WILKINSON, supra note 52, at 317-24 (describing the conservation prac- R
tices of tribes). In any event, should indigenous communities opt to pursue eco-
nomic development, such is their right. See Proposed Declaration , supra note 4, at
art. XXI, para. 1 (“The states recognize the right of indigenous peoples to decide
democratically what values, objectives, priorities and strategies will govern and steer
their development course . . . .”). The legal priority in such instances is not unique to
indigenous peoples, and is simply to ensure that indigenous communities are not
subjected to duress, fraud, political corruption, or undue economic pressures in their
dealings with majoritarian governments and corporations.  Tellingly, it is usually in
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situations where outright  appropriation of indigenous lands and
resources would otherwise occur,130 international protections for
indigenous property rights achieve a net environmental benefit.
This prophylactic effect essentially is an elaboration of the  fun-
damental characteristic of private property in Anglo-American
law—the right of the property owner to exclude others.131  How-
ever, in the context of indigenous property, the exclusionary
right must be understood in terms of the “varied and specific
forms and modalities of [indigenous] control, ownership, use and
enjoyment of territories and property.”132  Although indigenous
ownership systems are nearly as diverse as the cultures them-
selves, they generally revolve around some sort of communal
land tenure in which ownership of the land is “not centered on an
individual but rather on the group and its community.”133  Thus,
those instances where such abuses have occurred that indigenous peoples have
tended to strike disadvantageous bargains. See, e.g. , WILKINSON, supra note 52, at R
306-10 (providing an example of corrupt legal representation in an environmentally
destructive and financially disastrous coal-mining project); id.  at 40-41 (discussing a
fraudulent treaty ceding over 7 million acres of tribal land); id. at 19-20, 50 (detailing
agreements signed under government duress); see also Chris Ballard, The Denial of
Traditional Land Rights , in CULTURAL SURVIVAL Q., Fall 2002, at 39, 41-42, availa-
ble at  http://209.200.101.189/publications/csq/csq-article.cfm?id=1565&highlight=
Amungme (discussing a post-hoc compensation agreement signed under duress).  Fi-
nally, in some cases, such as where government agencies are responsible for strictly
enforcing the territorial rights of uncontacted tribes, the choice to exclude or condi-
tion entry will not rest with the indigenous community at all, and the protective
effect will therefore be absolute, assuming the existence of a proxy (perhaps an
NGO) that can effectively assert the indigenous community’s rights in the event of
the state’s failure to fulfill its duties.
130 Outright appropriation frequently occurs where domestic property law offers
inadequate protections, see, e.g. , Maya Case , Case 12.053, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report
No. 40/04 at paras. 106-08, 110, 117, 126-27, 131, or is inadequately enforced, see,
e.g. , Brazil Report , supra note 3, at paras. 33, 82(f). R
131 See Thomas W. Merrill, Property and the Right to Exclude , 77 NEB. L. REV.
730, 754-55 (1998); see also Merrion v. Jicralla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 144-48
(1982) (discussing the right to exclude in the context of semi-sovereign indigenous
tribes in the United States).  This is not to suggest that indigenous property rights
are defined solely  by the right to exclude.  Rather, they exist at the center of a host
of cultural, economic, and political rights, including rights to self-determination and
self-government. See, e.g. , Awas Tingni Case , 2001 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., (ser. C) No.
79 at para. 149; Proposed Declaration , supra  note 4, at art. XV, para. 1 (including R
property rights within the scope of the indigenous rights to autonomy and self gov-
ernment); see also Merrion , 455 U.S. at 146-47 (emphasizing the difference between
the ordinary exclusionary rights of individual land owners and sovereign exclusion-
ary rights belonging to indigenous tribes in the United States).
132 Proposed Declaration , supra  note 4, at art. XVIII, para. 1.
133 Id.  at art. XV, para. 1; see also S. James Anaya & Robert A. Williams, Jr., The
Protection of Indigenous Peoples’ Rights Over Lands and Natural Resources Under
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where an indigenous community has traditionally held its prop-
erty as a collective, the right to exclude must also rest with the
collective .134  Replacing indigenous systems of communal land
tenure with, for instance, Anglo-American-style individual prop-
erty rights destroys the essential character of the exclusionary
right, fracturing it among all the members of the community and
destroying its unitary force.135  In short, recognizing an exclusion-
ary right that is truly protective of the indigenous land base lies,
not in altering indigenous ownership patterns to fit Anglo-Amer-
ican property-law systems, but in expanding Anglo-American
property-law systems to accommodate indigenous ownership
patterns.136
The experience of indigenous peoples in the United States dra-
matically illustrates this point.  For most of the period between
1870 and 1970, the U.S. government dedicated itself to destroy-
ing tribal communal property structures and forcing Anglo-
American modes of individual ownership upon indigenous peo-
ples, most notably through an “allotment” policy designed to
split up tribal lands and redistribute them as privately held par-
cels.137  President Theodore Roosevelt famously described allot-
the Inter-American Human Rights System , 14 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 33, 43-44 (2001)
(emphasizing the wide diversity of ownership patterns that exist among indigenous
peoples, but noting that these patterns are generally grouped around notions of col-
lective ownership).
134 See Awas Tingni Case , 2001 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., (ser. C) No. 79 at para. 149
(defining an indigenous property right as “a communal form of collective property
of the land, in the sense that ownership of the land is not centered on an individual
but rather on the group and its community”) (emphasis added).
135 Compare, e.g. , Maya Case , Case 12.053, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 40/04
at para. 117 (emphasizing a right of collective ownership), with, e.g. , 2 William
Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England (Wayne Morrison, ed., Caven-
dish Publishing 2001) (1766) (defining the right of property as “that sole  and des-
potic dominion which one man  claims and exercises over the external things of the
world, in total exclusion of the right of any other individual in the universe”) (em-
phasis added).
136 See, e.g. , Maya Case , Case 12.053, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 40/04 at para.
117 (“[T]he application of the American Declaration [of the Rights and Duties of
Man] to the situation of indigenous peoples requires the taking of special measures
to ensure recognition of the particular and collective interest that indigenous people
have in the occupation and use of their traditional lands and resources . . . .”) (citing
Dann Case, Case 11.140, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 75/02, OEA/Ser.L/II.117,
doc. 5 rev. 1 para. 131 (2002), available at  http://www.cidh.org/annualrep/2002eng/
USA.11140.htm.).
137 Allotment was the U.S. government’s official Indian policy from the 1887 pas-
sage of the General Allotment Act (or “Dawes Act”), ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388 (1887)
(repealed by Pub. L. No. 106-462, § 106(a)(1), 114 Stat. 1991, 2007 (2000)), until
1934 when the policy was officially ended by the Indian Reorganization Act (IRA),
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ment as “a mighty pulverizing engine to break up the tribal
[land] mass.”138  His description, if crude, was apt.  By fracturing
communal property structures, the United States also under-
mined tribal solidarity, inviting a rush on tribal lands and re-
sources by non-Indian ranchers, land-speculators, miners,
loggers, and industrial interests that ultimately devastated indige-
nous economies and ruined local ecologies.139  This “divide and
conquer” approach was lubricated by the economic realities of
reservation life.  Granting valuable individual land rights to im-
poverished peoples at the very time their traditional economies
were collapsing under the weight of assimilationist pressures vir-
tually assured the wholesale transfer of Indian lands and re-
sources to non-Indians.140  And that is precisely what happened.
Of the 140 million acres in tribal possession prior to the com-
mencement of allotment in 1887, only 52 million acres remained
by 1934.141  The termination program introduced in 1953 severed
an additional 1.3 million acres.142
ch. 576, 48 Stat. 984 (1934) (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 461-479 (2006)). WILKINSON,
supra note 52, at 43, 60.  The professed goal of allotment was to turn Indians into R
farmers, thereby assimilating them into the majority culture. Id. at 43.  To this end,
Indian reservations were split into individually held plots (typically 160 acres each),
with any remaining “surplus” lands opened up to non-Indian settlement. Id. at 43,
50.  A similar “termination” policy announced by Congress in 1953 was designed to
sell off tribal lands and assimilate Indian people into the majority culture. Id.  at xiii,
81.  The policy, announced by House Concurrent Resolution 108, was effectuated
through individual acts targeted at specific tribes.  Charles F. Wilkinson & Eric R.
Biggs, The Evolution of the Termination Policy , 5 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 139, 151
(1977).
138 Getches II, supra note 53, at 1584 (quoting 35 CONG. REC. S90 (1901)). R
139 See, e.g. , WILKINSON, supra note 52, at 15-18, 47-51 (describing the effects of R
allotment on the Quinault and the Nez Perce tribes); see also id.  at 16 (“Allotment
brought woe to every tribe it touched . . . .”); id. at 182 (“There were no success
stories among the terminated tribes.  With their reservations liquidated, members
fled to cities or remained near their former homeland, the sense of community shat-
tered and their economic status diminished even more.”).
140 Allottees received fee title to their allotments upon the expiration of a twenty-
five year period during which the United States held the allotments in trust for the
individual allottees.  General Allotment Act, ch. 119, § 5, 24 Stat. at 389.  Most hav-
ing little cultural inclination to farm (even if they were so inclined, their allotments
often were ill-suited to farming), allottees frequently sold or leased their allotments
to non-Indians, or lost them to mortgage foreclosures and tax defaults. See WILKIN-
SON, supra note 52, at 16, 49, 71.  Moreover, many tribal lands simply were desig- R
nated as “surplus” and opened to immediate non-Indian settlement. See, e.g. , id. at
50 (discussing the experience of the Nez Perce).
141 WILKINSON, supra note 52, at 43. R
142 Id.  at 81.  Some tribes were particularly hard hit.  The Nez Perce Reservation
in Idaho, once a vast, unbroken expanse of treaty-reserved territory, is now a check-
erboard of tribal and (mostly) non-tribal lands. Id. at 51.  In total, allotment cost the
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The Quinault Indian Nation is one of the many tribes to have
suffered the devastating consequences of allotment.  The
Quinault inhabit a 200,000 acre reservation along twenty-six
miles of coastline on the Olympic Peninsula of Washington.143  In
the early 1950s, they were a stable, if very poor, population, able
to maintain a semi-traditional subsistence economy through reli-
ance on their abundant fisheries and rich forest resources.144  But
the prior allotment of their lands from 1905 to 1911145 had set in
motion forces that were about to alter their course dramatically.
Allotment had transferred reservation ownership from a single,
tribally owned block into more than 2000 individually held par-
cels, some of which were subsequently acquired by non-Indi-
ans.146  These allotments held some of the most valuable
commercial timber on earth, and the dissolution of communal
ownership dramatically altered the management incentives, en-
couraging individual allottees to seek large, one-time payments
in exchange for clear-cutting their parcels.147  The BIA-managed
logging operations, which began in 1922148 but accelerated in the
1950s and continued into the 1970s, devastated the reserva-
Nez Perce 664,000 of the 750,000 acres (eighty-eight percent) of the lands the tribe
had retained by treaty in 1863. Id. Of the remaining land, only 36,409 acres are now
tribally owned; the other 49,252 acres are held as individual allotments, frozen in
perpetual trust by the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934. Id.  at 51, 60.  Of course,
even the tribe’s pre-allotment landholdings were a mere fraction of the sweeping
13.5 million acre territory the tribe controlled heading into treaty negotiations with
the United States in 1855. See id.  at 44 tbl.  Although the 1855 treaty reserved 8
million acres to the Nez Perce, miners discovered trace amounts of gold on the res-
ervation shortly after the treaty was signed, leading to a second land reduction treaty
in 1863. Id. at 39-40.  The second treaty, which ceded an additional 7.25 million
acres, was executed on behalf of the entire tribe even though several Nez Perce
bands had not consented. See id.
143 Id. at 13-14.
144 See id. at 13-15.
145 Quinault Allottee Ass’n v. United States, 485 F.2d 1391, 1394 (1973), cert. de-
nied , 416 U.S. 961 (1974).
146 As with other allotted reservations, the Quinault Reservation was immediately
divided into individual parcels, but the allottees could not take fee title until the
expiration of a twenty-five year trust period.  General Allotment Act, Ch. 119, § 5,
24 Stat. 388, 389 (1887) (repealed by Pub. L. No. 106-462, § 106(a)(1), 114 Stat. 1991,
2007 (2000)).  However, the IRA of 1934 ended the allotment policy, freezing the
individual trusts indefinitely.  IRA, ch. 576, § 2, 48 Stat. at 984.  As a result, most
(about 2/3) of the Quinault Reservation remains in trust.  Mitchell v. United States,
591 F.2d 1300, 1300-01 (1979), rev’d  445 U.S. 535 (1980).
147 WILKINSON, supra note 52, at 16. R
148 Quinault Allottee Ass’n , 485 F.2d at 1395.
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tion.149  The loggers tore up the land, bulldozing streambeds to
build roads and leaving behind vast clear-cuts choked with
slash.150  Erosion and stream blockages caused salmon runs to
decline, and the failure to remove slash piles slowed forest regen-
eration to a crawl.151  The only real winners were the non-Indian
logging companies.  The BIA failed to secure fair timber prices
for allottees, meaning the timber companies harvested a pre-
mium resource at a bargain price while escaping costs associated
with slash removal and other sound forestry practices.152
Of course, this sort of forced replacement of traditional modes
of indigenous ownership with culturally alien ones is the very
kind of human-rights abuse that international protections for in-
digenous property rights are designed to prevent.153  For its own
part, the United States seems finally to have foresworn assimila-
tionist land policies in favor of tribal management and control of
tribal lands.154  Under the current policy era of tribal self-deter-
mination, indigenous peoples in the United States have actually
increased their landholdings for the first time since European
colonialism took root in the Western Hemisphere.155  Not coinci-
dentally, this bolstering of the tribal land base, accompanied by a
widespread revival of traditional indigenous cultures, has mark-
149 WILKINSON, supra note 52, at 16-18. Because most of the allotments remained R
in trust, the BIA was in charge of overseeing the logging operations, id. at 16, for
which it charged a management fee that was subtracted from the proceeds of the
timber sales. Quinault Allottee Ass’n , 485 F.2d at 1395-96.
150 WILKINSON, supra note 52, at 17. R
151 Id.  at 17-18.
152 Id. at 18.  In 1971, 1465 Quinault allottees sued the United States for breach of
fiduciary duty associated with the BIA’s mismanagement of the Quinault logging
operation.  After extensive litigation and appeals, the U.S. Supreme Court held that
the allottees stated a claim for compensation based on a fiduciary duty imposed on
the United States by certain timber management statutes.  United States v. Mitchell,
463 U.S. 206, 225 (1983).
153 See Proposed Declaration , supra note 4, at art. XVIII, para. 1 (“Indigenous R
peoples have the right to the legal recognition of their varied and specific forms and
modalities of their control, ownership, use and enjoyment of territories and
property.”).
154 See WILKINSON, supra note 52, at 189-205, 242 (discussing the adoption and R
maintenance of the tribal “self determination” policy).  However, the U.S. Supreme
Court recently has blunted the impact of self-determination with decisions tending
to undermine tribal jurisdiction. See Getches II, supra note 53, at 1594; id. at 1595- R
1618 (discussing pivotal cases); see also WILKINSON, supra note 52, at 241-42 (con- R
trasting Congress’ recent consistency in the area of Indian policy with the judicial
turn toward “crabbed” interpretations of Indian rights).
155 WILKINSON, supra note 52, at 207. R
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place laws purporting to recognize indigenous property rights,160
domestic law does not always—as the experience of tribes in the
United States illustrates—offer full protection to indigenous
modes  of ownership.161  Moreover, even where domestic law is
substantively adequate, it is often mooted by uneven enforce-
ment,162 financial pressures on governments created by free-
trade agreements,163 and plain old political corruption.164  There-
fore, international law, inasmuch as it is insulated from the inter-
nal pressures and policy vacillations of individual states, has a
crucial role to play in creating cohesive, universal, property-
rights protections effective to halt or slow the raid on indigenous
lands and resources.
B. Reciprocal Diversity and Indigenous Stewardship
Besides shielding indigenous lands and resources from destruc-
tive uses by outside appropriators, effective exclusionary rights
also facilitate sustainable uses by indigenous occupants.  Tradi-
tional indigenous cultures reflect a deep interconnectedness be-
tween indigenous peoples and their ancestral homelands, a
relationship that promotes sustainable management and healthy
ecosystems.165  At the same time, a healthy indigenous land base
is crucial to the survival of indigenous peoples themselves, who
160 See, e.g. , Brazil Report , supra note 3, at paras. 5-6, 25-27 (noting Brazil’s deci- R
sive recognition of indigenous property rights).
161 See Maya Case, Case 12.053, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 40/04, OEA/
Ser.L/V/II.122, doc. 5 rev. 1 paras. 106-08, 110, 117, 126-27, 131 (2004), available at
http://www.cidh.org/annualrep/2004eng/Belize.12053eng.htm (contrasting the state’s
domestic law regarding indigenous property rights with international law more sen-
sitive to indigenous modes of communal ownership).
162 See, e.g. , Brazil Report , supra note 3, at paras. 33, 82(f) (noting insufficient R
enforcement of domestic rights).
163 See Manuel & Schabus, supra  note 62, at 242. R
164 See, e.g. , Perlez & Bonner, supra note 81 (describing Freeport-McMoRan’s
payouts to Indonesian military officials); see also Ballard, supra note 129, at 42 (not- R
ing the role of the Indonesian military in pressuring the Amungme people into sign-
ing an inadequate post hoc compensation agreement related to Freeport’s seizure of
Amungme lands for its mining operation).
165 See Proposed Declaration , supra note 4, at pmbl. para. 3 (“Recognizing the R
respect for the environment accorded by the cultures of indigenous peoples of the
Americas, and considering the special relationship between the indigenous peoples
and the environment, lands, resources and territories on which they live and their
natural resources”); Anaya & Williams, supra note 133, at 49 (“The land and re- R
source rights of indigenous peoples cannot be fully understood without an apprecia-
tion of the profound, sustaining linkages that exist between indigenous peoples and
their lands.”); see, e.g. , Brazil Report , supra note 3, at para. 63 (emphasizing the role R
of traditional Yanomami culture in preserving the ecology); Wallace, supra  note 19, R
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depend on their lands for cultural and spiritual vitality, and not
merely for economic gain.166  As noted in a 1996 United Nations
report, this symbiosis has not heretofore been widely understood
or adequately protected:
Many presumed “natural” ecosystems or “wilderness” areas
are in fact “human or cultural landscapes” resulting from mil-
lennial interactions with forest-dwellers[.]  Traditional ecologi-
cal knowledge is complex, sophisticated, and critically relevant
to understanding how to conserve forest ecosystems and to
utilize them sustainably[.]
. . . .
Unfortunately, since the complex links between biological and
cultural diversity have not been generally recognized in the
past, this has led to the destruction of biological diversity and
to the disappearance of languages, cultures and societies.167
Strong indigenous property rights confront this process of bio-
logical and cultural attrition by insulating from homogenizing de-
velopment pressures the variegated land base needed to sustain a
diversity of cultural approaches to human interaction with the
environment.168  By contrast, further assimilation of indigenous
peoples into an increasingly heterogeneous global society dis-
places modes of living uniquely adapted to nurture particular
at 11 (noting the connection between indigenous cultures and ecological preserva-
tion in the Brazilian Amazon).
166 Awas Tingni Case, 2001 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., (ser. C) No. 79, at para. 149; see
also Maya Case, Case 12.053, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 40/04, OEA/Ser.L/V/
II.122, doc. 5 rev. 1 para. 120 (Aug. 31, 2001), available at http://www.cidh.org/annu-
alrep/2004eng/Belize.12053eng.htm (emphasizing the nexus between indigenous
lands and indigenous peoples as important to “not only the protection of an eco-
nomic unit but the protection of the human rights of a collective that bases its eco-
nomic, social and cultural development upon their relationship with the land”);
Proposed Declaration , supra  note 4, at pmbl. para. 5 (“Recognizing that in many R
indigenous cultures, traditional collective systems for control and use of land, terri-
tory and resources, including bodies of water and coastal areas, are a necessary con-
dition for their survival, social organization, development and their individual and
collective well-being”); see, e.g. , Brazil Report , supra note 3, at paras. 22, 82(f) (em- R
phasizing the necessity of protecting the Yanomami land base to preserving the Ya-
nomamis’ “integrity as a people”).
167 See  The Secretary General, Implementation of Forest-Related Decisions of the
United Nations Conference on Evironment at the National and International Levels,
Including an Examination of Sectoral and Cross-Sectoral Linkages , Programme Ele-
ment I.3: Traditional Forest-Related Knowledge, paras. 16(b)-(c), 17, delivered to the
Ad Hoc Intergovernmental Panel on Forests , E/CN.17/IPF/1996/9 (Feb. 12, 1996),
available at  http://www.un.org/documents/ecosoc/cn17/ipf/1996/ecn17ipf1996-9.htm
[hereinafter UN Report].
168 See id.  at para. 17 (Feb. 12, 1996) (noting the simultaneous erosion of biologi-
cal and cultural diversity).
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ecosystems, increasing human stresses on those ecosystems, and
exacerbating environmental harms.169
Much of the evidence for the environmental advantages of in-
digenous stewardship can be inferred from the millennial interac-
tions of indigenous peoples with their ancestral homelands,
particularly when contrasted with the rapid environmental degra-
dation that occurs when indigenous territories are overtaken by
corporations and other appropriators.  For instance, the Ya-
nomami people have inhabited the Orinoco River region of pre-
sent-day Venezuela and Brazil for at least 2000 years while
maintaining a relatively stable, self-sufficient economy and rela-
tionship with their environment.170  But beginning in the latter
half of the twentieth century (and continuing today) non-indige-
nous demographic and economic expansionism has threatened
that stability as local ecologies and indigenous communities are
destroyed to make way for mining, agriculture, stockraising, and
other exploitations.171
Halting this process and maintaining pre-colonial indigenous
stewardship of lands and resources works best where uncon-
tacted indigenous tribes are entirely shielded from non-indige-
nous encroachment and acculturation.  As Indian rights advocate
and former president of Brazil’s National Foundation for the In-
digenous (FUNAI)172 Sydney Possuelo has observed,  “In pro-
tecting the isolated Indian, you are also protecting millions of
hectares of biodiversity.”173  Despite the overwhelming trend to-
ward globalization, Brazil and other Latin American nations
have begun to answer this call, undertaking efforts to demarcate
indigenous territories so as to better preserve indigenous cultures
in the face of assimilative pressures.174  International law can bol-
169 See id. ; see also HUNTER ET AL., supra note 7, at 54-55 (describing the growing R
ecological footprint created by expanding consumerism); see Wood, supra note 3, at R
1483-88 (noting that many tribes in the United States have partnered with non-In-
dian industrial interests and are “poised to enter the capitalist economy,” posing
threats to the environment).
170 Brazil Report , supra note 3, at para. 63. R
171 Id. at paras. 28, 33, 63, 68.
172 FUNAI is a Brazilian agency which has tutelary jurisdiction over indigenous
areas, maintains educational and health care facilities in those areas, and takes part
in any legal proceeding in which an indigenous person or an indigenous community
is involved. Id. at para. 17.
173 Wallace, supra  note 19, at 11 (quoting Indian rights advocate Sydney R
Possuelo).
174 See, e.g. , Brazil Report , supra note 3, at para. 31 (noting Brazil’s efforts to R
demarcate indigenous lands); see also id. at paras. 5-16 (noting Brazil’s rejection of
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ster such efforts by liberating them from competing domestic ec-
onomic and political pressures.
Indigenous peoples who already have endured varying levels
of acculturation present a different case.  Just as the prophylactic
benefits of indigenous property rights are diluted where indige-
nous communities do not fully exercise their exclusionary
rights,175 the benefits of indigenous land stewardship will be less-
ened where indigenous peoples have adopted, forcibly or other-
wise, the economic practices of their colonizers.  This is the
inevitable result of assimilation—a loss of cultural diversity that
yields a loss of biological diversity.176  For instance, indigenous
peoples in the United States have been stripped of much of their
historical land base pursuant to government policies that accom-
panied nearly 100 years of forced acculturation.177  As a result,
they have lost their traditional means of subsistence, and their
cultures have been indelibly changed;178 notes Charles Wilkin-
son, “[T]he battalions of assimilation have marched on every
tribe.”179  Thus, it is unsurprising that many tribal councils have
partnered with non-Indian industrial interests to pursue develop-
ment of tribal lands.180
But such forays into capitalism should be understood in terms
of economic necessity,181 not as cultural abandonment.182  In-
deed, development decisions typically invite intense intra-tribal
controversy,183 and tribal councils often are torn between the
need to provide for the basic needs of their communities and the
responsibility they feel for the health of their lands.184  Moreo-
ver, despite these inner tensions, indigenous communities in the
United States today are playing an active and vital role in the
stewardship of lands and resources,185  particularly as they re-
assimilationist policies and describing Brazil’s constitutional protections for indige-
nous property and traditional indigenous uses of land and resources).
175 See discussion accompanying notes 126-131. R
176 UN Report , supra  note 162, at paras. 16(b)-(c), 17. R
177 See text accompanying notes 137-152. R
178 See WILKINSON, supra  note 52, at 353-55. R
179 Id. at 354.
180 See Wood, supra note 3, at 1483-86. R
181 WILKINSON, supra  note 52, at xiv, 324, 349; GETCHES I, supra note 34, at 15-16. R
(describing poor economic conditions on reservations).
182 See WILKINSON, supra  note 52, at 353-55 (discussing the tenacity of the “In- R
dian worldview” in the face of the “battalions of assimilation”).
183 See Wood, supra note 3, at 1486-87. R
184 See WILKINSON, supra  note 52, at 324. R
185 See id. at 317-24.
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build their land base,186 revive their traditional cultures,187 and
generally move out of the shadow of allotment and termination.
The recovery of the Quinault of the Pacific Northwest from
destructive allotment-era land policies provides a noteworthy ex-
ample.  After their reservation was left in ruins by allotment and
termination-era logging, the Quinault moved quickly in the 1970s
to reestablish tribal management of forestlands, thereby revital-
izing fisheries and instituting much greater levels of environmen-
tal protection than had existed under BIA management.188  Said
one tribal member, “We don’t need to be gigantic business suc-
cesses, we don’t need to be gigantic property developers.  We
should protect the basic things of our life, the fishing, the forest,
the beach, the game, and the rivers.”189  This commitment to con-
servation is inextricably bound up with the right of property—the
right of the Quinault to manage their lands as they see fit, in
accordance with their pre-colonial customs, traditions, and exper-
tise.  As the Quinault experience shows, the choice between dis-
respecting and respecting that right can mean the choice between
a debris-choked clear-cut and a thriving forest ecosystem.
C. Systemic Benefits: Symbolism, Theory, and Human Rights
Environmental benefits aside, each new treaty, resolution, pro-
tocol, and judicial or administrative opinion advancing indige-
nous property rights contributes to a symbolically important
renouncement of 500 years of colonialism and further discredits
the racist theoretical underpinnings of many domestic property
law regimes.190  Moreover, according legal recognition to indige-
nous land tenure absorbs into the law a fundamentally different
approach to the distribution of land and resources, one that re-
spects development along paths unmarked by neocolonialist so-
cioeconomic structures.191  By thus freeing the concept of
186 See id. at 207.
187 Id. at 352-55.
188 Id. at 318-21.
189 Id. at 321 (quoting Joe DeLaCruz).
190 See supra text accompanying notes 50-55, discussing the legacy of Johnson v. R
McIntosh ; see also Jeremy Firestone et al., Cultural Diversity, Human Rights, and the
Emergence of Indigenous Peoples in International and Comparative Environmental
Law , 20 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 219, 240-42 (2005) (noting the decolonizing effects of
international indigenous rights agreements).
191 See, e.g. , Proposed Declaration , supra note 4, at pmbl. para. 2 (emphasizing R
the right of indigenous peoples to pursue development “in accordance with their own
traditions, needs and interests”) (emphasis added); id. at art. XXI, para. 1 (“The
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“development” from a particular (environmentally destructive)
economic approach, the competing goals of sustainable develop-
ment are brought closer into harmony.
And finally, for the indigenous peoples who have suffered for
centuries at the hands of colonialist and neocolonialist invaders,
the importance of indigenous property rights reaches far beyond
their impact on environmental sustainability.  Rather, they re-
present crucial human  rights.  Although property rights are im-
portant to any human-rights system (implicating, for example,
the right to privacy), for indigenous peoples, they are at the abso-
lute center of an intricate web of social, cultural, and economic
rights.192  As the Inter-American Court of Human Rights has
explained:
[T]he close ties of indigenous people with the land must be
recognized and understood as the fundamental basis of their
cultures, their spiritual life, their integrity, and their economic
survival.  For indigenous communities, relations to the land
are not merely a matter of possession and production but a
material and spiritual element which they must fully enjoy,
even to preserve their cultural legacy and transmit it to future
generations.193
D. Implementation and Enforcement Concerns
Of course, the bare acknowledgement of indigenous property
rights is not alone adequate to achieve the environmental, idea-
tional, or human-rights benefits discussed above.  Setting aside
states recognize the right of indigenous peoples to decide democratically what val-
ues, objectives, priorities and strategies  will govern and steer their development
course, even where they are different from those adopted by the national government
or by other segments of society .”) (emphasis added); cf. BLAUT, supra note 1, at 28- R
29.
192 See, e.g. , Maya Case, Case 12.053, Inter-Am C.H.R. Report No. 40/04, OEA/
Ser.L/V/II.122, doc. 5 rev. 1 para. 120 (2004) available at http://www.cidh.org/annu-
alrep/2004eng/Belize.12053eng.htm:
[T]he protection of the right to property of the indigenous people to their
ancestral territories is . . . of particular importance, because the effective
protection of ancestral territories implies not only the protection of an eco-
nomic unit but the protection of the human rights of a collective that bases
its economic, social and cultural development upon their relationship with
the land.
193 Awas Tingni Case, 2001 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., (ser. C) No. 79, para. 149 (Aug.
31, 2001) available at http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/seriec_79_ing.
pdf.
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certain limitations inherent to international law,194 the following
implementation and enforcement measures are critical to the ef-
ficacy of indigenous property-rights protections: (1) the establish-
ment of international tribunals competent to identify and remedy
violations of indigenous property rights, whether such violations
occur at the hands of states or are precipitated by third parties
acting pursuant to state authorization (or acquiescence);195 (2)
the recognition of certain supplementary procedural rights al-
lowing indigenous peoples to actively participate in the enforce-
ment of their substantive property rights;196 (3) the establishment
of administrative procedures obligating states to consider the ef-
fects on indigenous lands and resources of state and state-author-
ized actions within their national borders;197 and (4) the
194 These limitations include (1) the general inability of international law to im-
pose binding duties absent state consent (see HUNTER ET AL., supra note 7 at 273, R
304-05, but see id. at 314 (discussing “peremptory norms”)); (2) the dearth of com-
pliance mechanisms responsive to violations of international law, see id. at 272-73,
448-49, 479-83; (3) the need to rely on the potentially inadequate institutional capac-
ity of state governments to implement and enforce international law, see id. at 469;
and (4) the limited capacity of international law to impose direct duties on non-state
actors, see, e.g. , Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 794 (D.C. Cir.
1984) (per curiam) (Edwards, J. concurring); id. at 805-06 (Bork, J., concurring).
But see HUNTER ET AL., supra note 7, at 289 n.3 (noting increasing opportunities for R
participation of non-state actors in the processes of international law).
195 The Inter-American Human Rights System, discussed infra  at Part IV, pro-
vides an example of an international court empowered to issue binding decisions
with respect to international human-rights documents.  Although the requirement
could be fulfilled solely through new or existing domestic tribunals, see HUNTER ET
AL., supra note 7, at 469, an international tribunal is probably preferable given the R
ineffectiveness of some domestic courts in enforcing indigenous property rights laws.
See, e.g. , Brazil Report , supra note 3, at paras. 33, 82(f) (noting judicial and political R
erosion of indigenous land rights).
196 In general, these “enabling rights” embrace due-process concerns and include
the right to popular participation in public affairs, the right to equal protection and
to be free from discrimination, the right to judicial recourse and remedy, and the
right to information. See HUNTER ET AL., supra note 7, at 1312-17.  Two specific R
procedural rights, related to information and public-participation rights, are criti-
cally important in the context of indigenous property rights.  The first is the right to
consultation with respect to state or state-authorized actions within indigenous terri-
tories. See, e.g. , Maya Case , Case 12.053, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 40/04 at
paras. 152-53 (recognizing consultation rights).  The second is the right of indigenous
peoples to participate in state decisions affecting indigenous lands and resources.
See, e.g. , Proposed Declaration , supra note 4, at art. XVIII, para. 5 (guaranteeing R
participatory rights).
197 An effective treaty regime would require states to adopt administrative proce-
dures that scrutinize government and government-authorized action through the
lens of indigenous property rights. Cf. , Proposed Declaration , supra note 4, at art. R
XVIII, para. 5 (requiring, in conjunction with indigenous participatory rights, gov-
ernmental consideration of the impacts on indigenous peoples when states engage in
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demarcation of indigenous territories so that states have notice of
the boundaries they are charged with protecting and tribunals
may more easily determine when a particular action has violated
indigenous rights.198  Such measures address many of the struc-
tural obstacles to according indigenous peoples effective prop-
erty rights within the context of antagonistic domestic property
law regimes—many of which have evolved, after all, to achieve
the very opposite end: the denial  of indigenous property rights to
serve the asserted proprietary interests of political majorities.199
IV
THE INTER-AMERICAN HUMAN RIGHTS SYSTEM
AND INDIGENOUS PROPERTY RIGHTS
The Inter-American Human Rights System (IAHRS) presents
a promising example of the use of existing human rights struc-
or authorize extraction of state-owned resources located on or under indigenous
territories).  Properly realized, these requirements would create something akin to
an international “NEPA” for indigenous property rights, which individual states
could then implement on the domestic level through parallel policies and enact-
ments. Cf. National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (2006) (re-
quiring U.S. government agencies to assess the environmental impacts of
contemplated government action).  Administrative safeguards would be especially
important where indigenous peoples are unable to assert their own rights, as is the
case where “uncontacted” tribes remain isolated from majoritarian societies and
governments.  Some states already have administrative agencies that serve, or could
be adapted to serve, this purpose. See, e.g. , Brazil Report , supra note 3, at para. 17 R
(discussing FUNAI, the Brazilian agency charged with defending indigenous rights).
198 See, e.g. , Proposed Declaration , supra note 4, at art. XVIII, para. 8 (“The R
states shall give maximum priority to the demarcation and recognition of properties
and areas of indigenous use.”); Awas Tingni Order, Provisional Measures of Sept. 6,
2002, available at  http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/medidas/mayagna_se_01_ing.pdf;
see Wallace, supra , note 19, at 9-10 (describing current efforts to demarcate the R
territories of uncontacted tribes in the Brazilian Amazon); Anaya & Williams, supra
note 133, at 77 (noting the importance of demarcation). R
199 See supra Part II (discussing the evolution of colonialist conceptions of indige-
nous property rights); supra Part III.A (discussing former U.S. policies designed to
open tribal lands to non-Indian settlement). But see Brazil Report , supra note 3, at R
paras. 5-6, 25-27 (discussing the state’s decisive recognition of indigenous property
rights); Anaya & Williams, supra note 133, at 58-59 (noting a trend in the domestic R
law of many nations toward recognizing indigenous property rights).  For an exam-
ple of how international law can be used to accord indigenous peoples supplemen-
tary legal protections in the face of inadequate domestic property law regimes, see
Maya Case , Case 12.053, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 40/04 at paras. 106-108, 110,
117, 126-27, 131 (backstopping inadequate domestic conceptions of aboriginal prop-
erty rights with international rights requiring the consultation and consent of indige-
nous peoples prior to governmental authorization of resource extraction on
indigenous lands).
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tures to protect indigenous property rights and provides a posi-
tive model for more expansive international efforts in the area.
The IAHRS is an arm of the Organization of American States
(OAS), an association of the thirty-five independent nations of
the Americas.200  Working through the Inter-American Commis-
sion on Human Rights (based in Washington, D.C.) and the In-
ter-American Court of Human Rights (based in San Jose´, Costa
Rica), the IAHRS provides recourse to people in the Americas
who have suffered human-rights violations at the hands of the
state.201  The Commission hears petitions in individual cases and
also issues reports addressing the human rights conditions of
member states.202  The Court can hear cases referred to it by the
Commission, and is empowered to issue binding decisions against
those members that have accepted its jurisdiction.203
Together, the Commission and Court have issued an impres-
sive body of international case law articulating strong indigenous
property rights.  Key to their jurisprudence in this area has been
their willingness to broadly interpret existing human-rights docu-
ments so as to embrace indigenous conceptions of property own-
ership.204  For instance, in the much celebrated205 case of
Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community v. Nicaragua , the
Court broadly construed the right to property contained in Arti-
cle 21 of the American Convention on Human Rights to include
property held communally by indigenous peoples.206  The deci-
sion was the “first legally binding decision by an international
tribunal to uphold the collective land and resource rights of
200 See Organization of American States, About the OAS: Member States and Per-
manent Missions , http://www.oas.org/main/main.asp?sLang=E&sLink=../../docu-
ments/eng/oasinbrief.asp (follow “About OAS” hyperlink) (last visited Oct. 1, 2006).
201 See Organization of American States, Key OAS Issues: Protecting Human
Rights , http://www.oas.org/main/main.asp?sLang=E&sLink=http://www.oas.org/
DIL/treaties_and_agreements.htm (last visited Oct. 1, 2006).
202 Jorge Daniel Taillant, Environmental Advocacy and the Inter-American
Human Rights System , The Center for Human Rights and Environment 9 (2001),
excerpted in HUNTER ET AL., supra note 7, at 1328-29. R
203 Id.
204 See generally Anaya & Williams, supra note 133. R
205 See id.  at 37-38.
206 See Awas Tingni Case, 2001 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., (ser. C) No. 79, para. 148
(Aug. 31, 2001), available at http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/seriec_
79_ing.pdf.
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indigenous peoples in the face of a state’s failure to do so.”207
In Awas Tingni , the indigenous community challenged Nicara-
gua’s grant of a logging concession to a foreign corporation on
lands claimed by the community.208  The Court began its analysis
with Article 21, which states in relevant part: “Everyone has the
right to the use and enjoyment of his property.”209  Noting that it
was bound by the Convention to broadly interpret human-rights
documents, the Court held that Article 21 embraced a right to
property in a sense which includes indigenous patterns of com-
munal ownership and possession.210  The Court went on to clarify
the nature of this right: “Among indigenous peoples there is a
communitarian tradition regarding a communal form of collec-
tive property of the land, in the sense that ownership of the land
is not centered on an individual but rather on the group and its
community.”211  Applying that principle to the case before it, the
Court held Nicaragua in violation of Article 21 and, in a later
proceeding, ordered the state to protect the community’s lands
from further encroachment until court-ordered demarcation pro-
cedures had been completed.212
Notable about the Awas Tingni case was the Court’s clarifica-
tion that Nicaraguan law did not dictate its interpretation of the
Convention.  It stressed that the rights articulated in interna-
tional human-rights documents “have an autonomous meaning,
for which reason they cannot be made equivalent to the meaning
given to them [by] domestic law.”213  Although Nicaraguan law
itself recognized communal property rights, the statement is im-
portant because it liberates the Court’s jurisprudence from
residual colonialist influences in state property law regimes.  On
the other hand, while the Court declined to use Nicaraguan law
as a touchstone, it did specifically refer to Awas Tingni custom in
holding that possession of the land was sufficient to establish a
property right, even absent formal legal title.214  This deferral to
207 S. James Anaya & Claudio Grossman, The Case of Awas Tingni v. Nicaragua:
A New Step in the International Law of Indigenous Peoples , 19 ARIZ. J. INT’L &
COMP. L. 1, 2 (2002).
208 Awas Tingni Case , 2001 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) Case No. 79 at para. 103.
209 Id.  at para. 106 (citing American Convention, supra  note 22, art. 21). R
210 See id.  at para. 148.
211 Id. at para. 149.
212 Awas Tingni Order, Provisional Measures of Sept. 6, 2002, available at  http://
www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/medidas/mayagna_se_01_ing.pdf.
213 Awas Tingni Case , 2001 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 79 at para. 146.
214 Id. at para. 151.
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indigenous custom represents a marked departure from the colo-
nialist practice of ignoring or marginalizing indigenous systems of
land tenure when articulating legal rights.215
Several reports of the Commission in individual-petition cases
echo the Court’s expansive approach to indigenous property
rights.  A representative case is Maya indigenous community of
the Toledo District v. Belize .  There, the Maya people alleged that
Belize violated Article XXIII of the American Declaration on
the Rights and Duties of Man216 by granting logging and oil con-
cessions on over 700,000 acres of the Mayas’ ancestral territories
without consulting the Maya people.217  Article XXIII protects
“the right to own such private property as meets the essential
needs of decent living and helps to maintain the dignity of the
individual and of the home.”218
Although Belize—which had inherited a colonialist property
rights system from Great Britain219—suggested that the Maya
people did not possess “aboriginal rights” in the disputed lands
under Belizian common law,220 the Commission determined that
domestic law had no impact on the Maya’s rights under interna-
tional law.221  It then concluded that the Mayas held an indige-
nous communal property right in the disputed territories,222  a
right the state was bound to protect under Article XXIII.223  Ac-
cordingly, the state had violated Article XXIII by (1) failing to
recognize and legally protect the Mayas’ communal property
215 See supra  text accompanying notes 46-55. R
216 O.A.S. Res. XXX, adopted by  the Ninth International Conference of Ameri-
can States (May 2, 1948), reprinted in  Inter-Am. C.H.R., Basic Documents Pertain-
ing to Human Rights in the Inter-American System , OEA/Ser.L/V/II.82 doc. 6 rev. 1
at 17 (1992), available at http://www.cidh.org/Basicos/basic2.htm [hereinafter Ameri-
can Declaration].
217 See Maya Case, Case 12.053, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 40/04, OEA/
Ser.L/V/II.122, doc. 5 rev. 1 paras. 27, 99 available at http://www.cidh.org/ annualrep/
2004eng/Belize.12053eng.htm; Belize Admissibility Decision, Case 12.053, Inter-Am
C.H.R. Report No. 78/00, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.111, doc. 20 rev. 1 paras. 34, 36 (2000),
available at  http://www.cidh.org/annualrep/2000eng/ChapterIII/ Admissible/
Belize12.053.htm.
218 American Declaration, supra  note 216, at art. XXIII. R
219 See Maya Case , Case 12.053, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 40/04, at para.
106.
220 Id. at paras. 110, 126.
221 Id. at paras. 117, 131.
222 Id. at para. 127.
223 See id. at para. 151.
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rights, and (2) by granting logging and oil concessions in the Ma-
yas’ lands without the Mayas’ consultation and consent.224
Besides the decisions of the Commission and Court, the
IAHRS has developed a Proposed American Declaration on the
Rights of Indigenous Peoples.225  With respect to indigenous
property rights, the Declaration restates and reinforces the ex-
pansive principles outlined in the decisions of the Commission
and the Court.  As such, it embodies a remarkable rejection of
colonialist law and practice, particularly in its explicit recognition
of indigenous modes of property ownership,226 its affirmation of
indigenous rights to traditionally held lands and resources,227 and
its acknowledgment of the importance of those lands and re-
sources to the maintenance of indigenous life-systems.228  Al-
224 Id. at paras. 152, 153.  For a similarly expansive, earlier application of Article
XXIII of the American Declaration, see Dann Case, Case 11.140, Inter-Am. C.H.R.,
Report No. 75/02, OEA/Ser.L/II.117, doc. 5 rev. 1 paras. 143-45, 171-72 (2002), avail-
able at  http://www.cidh.org/annualrep/2002eng/USA.11140.htm.  Ever since the
United States instituted a trespass action against Mary and Carrie Dann in 1974 for
allegedly grazing cattle on federal lands without a permit, the sisters—members of
an autonomous band of the Western Shoshone Tribe—have been entrenched in a
court battle with the United States over its unilateral extinguishment of their aborig-
inal title to those lands. See Western Shoshone Nat’l v. United States, 415 F. Supp.
2d 1201, 1203-04 (D. Nev. 2006).  After repeated defeats at the domestic level, see,
e.g. , United States v. Dann, 470 U.S. 39 (1985), the sisters recently took their case
before the Commission and won a favorable decision (although no specific relief).
See Dann Case , Case 11.140, Inter-Am. C.H.R. Report No. 75/02 at paras. 171-72.
The Commission determined that the United States had violated the Dann sisters’
property rights by extinguishing their aboriginal title without the benefit of certain
legal protections accorded to fee owners under U.S. law. See id. at paras. 143-45,
171-72.  While the Commission declined to rule on the substantive issue of whether
the Dann sisters retained title to the disputed lands, see id. para. 171, at least one
commentator has noted that the Commission effectively determined that “many as-
pects of U.S. law relating to indigenous peoples are incompatible with international
human rights law,” including the rights of the United States under the discovery
doctrine (discussed supra in text accompanying notes 48-55) to unilaterally extin- R
guish indigenous land rights. See Anaya, supra note 159, at 46 n.138. R
225 Proposed Declaration , supra note 4. R
226 Id. at art. XVIII, para. 1 (“Indigenous peoples have the right to the legal rec-
ognition of their varied and specific forms and modalities of their control, owner-
ship, use and enjoyment of territories and property.”).
227 Id. at art. XVIII, para. 2 (“Indigenous peoples have the right to the recogni-
tion of their property and ownership rights with respect to lands, territories and
resources they have historically occupied, as well as to the use of those to which they
have historically had access for their traditional activities and livelihood”).
228 Id. at art. XVIII, para. 4 (“Indigenous peoples have the right  to an effective
legal framework for the protection of their rights . . . with respect to traditional uses
of their lands, interests in lands, and resources, such as subsistence.”).
\\server05\productn\O\OEL\21-1\OEL105.txt unknown Seq: 48 10-JAN-07 12:00
204 J. ENVTL. LAW AND LITIGATION [Vol. 21, 157
though the Declaration is properly characterized as “soft law,”229
the principles it states figure prominently in the decisions of the
Commission and Court,230 and may ultimately become binding as
customary international law.  Importantly, the Declaration was




IAHRS developments in the area of indigenous property
rights serve as a positive model for future international agree-
ments.  Together with the United Nation’s Draft Declaration on
the Rights of Indigenous Peoples232 and the International Labor
Organization’s Convention 169233 (the only international treaty
solely addressing indigenous rights), IAHRS innovations in this
field infuse international law with a tolerance and respect for di-
verse, sustainable  approaches to humankind’s interrelationship
to the environment.234  At a minimum, they help shield indige-
nous lands and resources from the appropriative force of the
global market economy.  These effects will positively impact the
global community’s efforts to implement the sustainable develop-
ment concept.  Therefore, together with measures directly
229 See Pierre-Marie Dupuy, Soft Law and the International Law of the Environ-
ment , 12 MICH. J. INT’L L. 420, 420-35 (1991) (describing so-called soft international
law). But see Dann Case, Case 11.140, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 860, Report No. 75/02 at
paras. 129-30 (noting that the Declaration had emerged as “general principles” of
international law).
230 See, e.g. , Dann Case, Case 11.140, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 860, Report No. 75/02,
OEA/Ser.L/II.117, doc. 5 rev. 1 paras. 129-30 (2002), available at http://
www.cidh.org/annualrep/2002eng/USA.11140.htm.
231 See Anaya & Williams, supra note 133, at 35. R
232 Draft Declaration , supra note 41. R
233 ILO 169 , supra  note 119. R
234 See, e.g. , Proposed Declaration , supra note 4, at pmbl. para. 5; id.  at art. VII, R
para. 3:
Recognizing that in many indigenous cultures, traditional collective sys-
tems for control and use of land . . . is varied and distinctive and does not
necessarily coincide with the systems protected by the domestic laws of the
states in which they live.
. . . .
The states shall recognize and respect indigenous ways of life, customs, tra-
ditions, forms of social, economic and political organization, institutions,
practices, beliefs and values, use of dress, and languages.
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addressing specific environmental issues, further initiatives in this
direction should be a central part of the international agenda for
realizing environmental sustainability.
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